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In this dissertation, I examine how available information affects promo-
tion and turnover decisions in internal labor markets. In the first essay, I use
data on all Major League Baseball managers from 1950 to 1996 to consider
multiple evaluation measures and their role in actual firings of managers. The
results indicate that firms use all of the distinct measures of managerial perfor-
mance in termination and rehire decisions. However, the results also suggest
that teams, in making termination decisions, use information that is unlikely
to reflect managerial ability. That is, talent at the time of hire affects the
risk of termination, even after conditioning on team performance relative to
expectations after the date of hire. In the second essay, I use the 1979 National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth data to explore the factors that are important
determinants of an individual’s promotion. One issue that arises in estimating
the probability of promotion from longitudinal work history data is that re-
searchers only observe promotion for individuals who remain at a job between
interviews. I improve upon earlier studies by using a bivariate probit analysis
to correct the bias from partial observability and provide more informative
vi
estimates of the promotion process. These new estimates allow differences in
promotion rates across demographic groups to be decomposed into differences
in the probability of promotion conditional on staying and differences in the
probability of staying. In the third essay, we explore the differential patterns of
job attachment between men and women by examining how men and women
respond to promotion expectations. Using the 1979 National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, we find that early in their career women with low promotion
expectations are more likely to stay on a job than corresponding men. We also
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Employment relationships develop and change over time. As workers gain
experience in the labor market and tenure at a firm, they gain and reveal
information. This new information affects the subsequent decisions of both the
workers and the firms, specifically turnover and promotion decisions. In the
following dissertation, I study how available information affects both turnover
and promotion.
Turnover decisions are important in any employment relationship and
they are assumed to reflect the productivity of the relationship. That is, if
a worker’s cost or wage exceeds the benefit to the firm then the firm will
end the relationship. Similarly, if a worker’s value in alternative employment
exceeds the current firm’s willingness to pay the worker then the worker will
end the relationship. However, in the case of workers, non-wage benefits are
also important determinants of the decision to leave a firm. Factors that the
worker may consider are the loss of any firm specific skills or knowledge, or
the presence of a job ladder within the firm. The latter consideration is of
particular interest. Workers who are likely to receive a promotion and its
benefits have a higher reservation wage and therefore are less likely to leave
a firm. As such, firms have an incentive to offer promotions to workers that
are more productive to encourage remaining with firm. The turnover and
promotion decisions are more difficult when information regarding productivity
1
and worker-firm match quality is either unobserved or noisy.
In chapter 2, I examine the case of high-level management. The produc-
tivity of high-level managers is hard to observe directly since these managers
often do not have a direct task in production. Compensation schemes and ter-
mination decisions must take the scarcity of information into account. Firms
must induce the desired actions by designing a compensation scheme that
gives the managers an incentive to perform the desired actions. However, in
these situations, any determinants of firm performance that can be observed
or inferred and are unrelated to the manager’s actions should be filtered out of
the performance measure. Therefore, compensation and termination decisions
should not respond to movements in firm performance due to inferable factors
not attributable to the agent.
I use Major League Baseball field manager to examine two specific
aspects of the market for high-level management. First, I test whether ter-
mination and rehire decisions depend on a measure of performance that does
not contain information on manager actions or ability. Second, I test whether
termination and rehire decisions depend on multiple measures of managerial
performance, each of which plausibly contains different information regarding
manager actions and ability. The data has advantages over data used in pre-
vious studies. The data I use has detailed information regarding the industry,
the production process, and the competitors in the industry. As such, I am
able to analyze the effects of multiple measures of manager performance as
well as a measure related to team performance but independent of a man-
ager’s actions- namely, team quality prior to a manager’s hire. Furthermore,
the data has a much higher frequency of performance realizations and con-
tains information about managers from the start of their career. The results
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indicate that firms use all of the distinct measures of managerial performance
in termination and rehire decisions. However, the results also suggest that
teams, in making termination decisions, use information that is unlikely to
reflect managerial ability. That is, player talent at the time of hire affects the
manager’s risk of termination, even after conditioning on team performance
relative to expectations after the date of hire.
In chapter 3, I examine the determinants of promotion. Specifically,
I address the role of gender in the promotion decision. It is a commonly
held belief that women face a ‘glass ceiling’ with regard to internal upward
mobility. Discrimination in the market for promotions may explain observed
wage differences between men and women since promotions are a significant
source of wage growth. I improve upon previous studies on gender differences
in promotion by addressing a particular selection issue that is present in any
estimation of promotion probability that relies on longitudinal work histories
to observe promotions. Namely, previous studies neither address the issue
that for an individual to receive a promotion that individual must stay on the
job nor the issue that an individual may turn down a promotion and leave
the firm or leave when not offered a promotion. I use the 1990 round of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to estimate a bivariate probit
model of promotion. The primary equation is an equation for promotion and
mirrors equations presented in previous literature. The secondary equation is
an equation for ‘staying on a job.’ The stay equation addresses the selection
issue present in the observed promotions. Allowing correlation in the error
terms across the equations and estimating the bivariate probit refines the es-
timates and yields more informative results. The significance of the estimated
correlation in the bivariate probit model suggests the univariate estimates for
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promotion conditional on staying on a job are biased.
Specifically, the results suggest that the univariate estimates of pro-
motion for women are not biased while the univariate estimates of promotion
for men are biased. The bivariate probit model also allows the probability of
an observed promotion (i.e. the joint probability of staying and receiving a
promotion offer) to be decomposed in the probability of promotion conditional
on staying on a job and the probability of staying on a job. These estimates
suggest that women are less likely to receive a promotion a priori than men all
else equal. The estimates also suggest that women are more likely to remain
on a job than men all else equal. Furthermore, there is evidence that women
stay on jobs in order to signal attachment to the labor market.
Chapter 4 explores this result. We study how the expectation of pro-
motion affects men’s and women’s decision to stay on a job and whether this
relative pattern varies with the amount of labor market experience. Since
training workers is a costly activity, firms are only willing to invest in those
workers from whom they expect to recoup the costs of training. Given that the
expected time horizon to recover these costs is shorter for women, firms may
be unwilling to train their women workers. And since training is invariably a
prerequisite for promotion, promotion rates for women may tend to be smaller
than those for men. However, if women are staying in careers and on jobs
longer then we would expect firms to treat these women - the ‘stayers’ - no
differently from men. A problem that arises is that women are a heterogenous
group comprising both ‘stayers’ and ‘quitters.’ If firms cannot distinguish
between the two types of women workers based on observables, statistical
discrimination would still result in lower promotion rates for women and a
persistence of the wage gap. If, on the other hand, the stayers could success-
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fully signal their intentions to stay in the labor force and separate themselves
from the quitters, they could overcome internal labor market discrimination.
It is our view that women who are concerned about their careers are us-
ing job attachment as a signal to indicate their attachment to the labor force.
We expect women with little or no job market experience to have lower job
turnover rates compared to men of similar experience, all else equal. There-
fore, during this period, we expect women’s turnover decisions to exhibit less
sensitivity to expectations of promotion, relative to men. This rationale also
suggests that once women have gained adequate labor market experience and
revealed themselves as stayers, their job attachment patterns should respond
more strongly to their expectations of promotions. We use NLSY data to ex-
amine how promotion expectations affect men’s and women’s decision to stay
on a job and whether this relative pattern varies with the amount of labor
market experience. We find evidence that women are more likely than men
to stay on a job all else equal and that women with low promotion expecta-
tions are more likely than comparable men to stay on a job. Furthermore, this
difference is more pronounced early in careers. The fact that the difference
diminishes with experience supports the signalling explanation.
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Chapter 2
Performance Evaluation and Turnover:
Field Managers in Major League Baseball
2.1 Introduction
Managerial effort and ability are crucial determinants of firm perfor-
mance but are often hard to observe directly because of the nature of high-
level management jobs. High-level managers often do not have a direct task
in production but rather perform hard to measure tasks such as organizing,
delegating, and motivating. Therefore, firm owners must structure compensa-
tion and make subsequent termination decisions in such a way as to encourage
high effort and attract high ability individuals to the job.
When profits are affected by the actions of an agent and are observable
to the principal, an efficient contract clearly states the actions to be taken
and the compensation for those actions. When an agent’s actions are not
directly observable to the principal, the principal must induce the desired
actions by designing a compensation scheme that gives the agent an incentive
to perform the desired actions. However, in these situations, any determinants
of firm performance that can be observed or inferred and are unrelated to the
manager’s actions should be filtered out of the performance measure.1 Thus,
1It is possible that agents are rewarded for outcomes that may or may not be related to
the manager’s actions.
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managerial wages and termination outcomes should not respond to movements
in observed performance due to inferable factors not attributable to the agent.2
Previous empirical studies have examined the relationship between the
performance of high-level managers and compensation. Early studies [Antle
and Smith (1986), Gibbons and Murphy (1990)] find support for the notion
that firms attempt to distinguish between changes in measured performance
due to manager input and changes in measured performance not attributable
to manager performance. Both papers present the concept of relative perfor-
mance evaluation where firms evaluate managers in relation to managers that
face the same common risk. Garen (1994) finds that, while the executive com-
pensation has aspects of the principal-agent problem, there is little evidence
to support the notion of relative performance evaluations. Hall and Leibman
(1998) show that while CEO pay responds significantly to changes in firm per-
formance relative performance evaluations are not a significant determinant of
compensation. Garvey and Milbourn (2003) also find little support for rela-
tive performance evaluations, in general, but do find evidence that firms use
relative performance evaluations when executives face high costs of shielding
themselves from market fluctuations.
Other studies have extended the idea of efficient compensation to in-
clude the retention decision firms make regarding managers. A number of em-
pirical studies [Weisbach (1988), Warner et al (1988), Gibbons and Murphy
(1990), Blackwell et al (1994), Geddes and Vinod(1997)] examine the relation-
ship between observable manager performance and termination. The results
2As an example, Holmstrom(1979) shows how the optimal wage contract changes when
an additional signal is added to the information set. The wage will depend on this additional
signal only if this signal provides incremental information about the agent’s action.
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from these studies support the notion that relative performance evaluations
are used to determine manager performance and that the performance evalu-
ations are used in retention decisions. However, DeFond and Park (1999) find
that the use of relative performance evaluation in turnover decisions depends
on the competitiveness of the industry. The more competitive the industry the
more important relative performance evaluations are in the turnover decision.
Extensions of these studies [Khorana (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999)]
examine how the relationship between termination and observed performance
changes as firms acquire information regarding manager performance. The
results from these studies suggest that as more information about a manager’s
performance is acquired the retention decision is less responsive to single per-
formance realizations.
In this paper, I examine termination and rehire decisions firms make re-
garding high-level managers. Specifically, I examine whether termination and
rehire decisions depend on a measure of performance that does not contain in-
formation on manager actions or ability. I also examine whether termination
and rehire decisions depend on multiple measures of managerial performance,
each of which plausibly contains different information regarding manager ac-
tions and ability. In order to answer these questions, I need a significant
amount of information regarding the industry involved, the production pro-
cess, and the competitors in the industry. The Major League Baseball manager
data I use has the necessary information and has some advantages relative to
the data used in previous studies. First, most prior studies simply relate man-
agerial wages and/or turnover to firm profit (in some cases relative to other
firms). These analyses are informative but are also limited because some
of the variation in firm profits may be due to factors beyond the manager’s
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control that are observable to shareholders but not the econometrician. In
contrast, the present data allow me to analyze the effects of multiple measures
of manager performance as well as a measure related to team performance but
independent of a manager’s actions- namely, team quality prior to a manager’s
hire.3 Lastly, the data has a much higher frequency of performance realiza-
tions than previous studies and contains information about managers from the
start of their career.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 presents
the econometric methodology. This section is divided into three parts. The
first part addresses the construction of expected performance levels for teams
aggregated from expected player performance; the second part addresses the
estimation of expected win probabilities for individual teams; and the third
part addresses the termination and rehire decisions made by teams regarding
managers. Section 2.3 concludes.
2.2 Econometric Methodology
In this paper, there are multiple components in the econometric model.
Each component builds toward the estimation of manager termination and re-
hire equations, which I assume are dependent upon manager performance and,
possibly, other factors. Isolating a manager’s performance (i.e. contribution to
wins) requires controlling for the quality of the players at his disposal. In order
to do so, it is necessary to estimate a model for team wins as a function of the
quality of players on both the manager’s own team and the opposing team.
3Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) account for a random shock to performance and find
that CEO compensation responds equally to performance attributable in part to manager
performance and performance not attributable to manager performance.
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Each player’s quality, in turn, depends on his age and individual-specific talent
level. To account for this relationship, I estimate models that relate individual
performance to age and individual fixed effects. The results from each of the
estimations are then used to construct measures of ‘excess performance’ due to
manager input, which are the key explanatory variables in the models of man-
agerial termination and rehire. Below, I first estimate individual-player-level
equations and use the results to construct aggregate player quality variables for
each team in each year. Next, I relate player quality levels of teams to wins by
estimating a probit equation for games won and I use the probit estimates to
generate expected win probabilities for each team in each game. Finally, I use
actual winning percentage as well as the expected winning percentage in the
termination and rehire equations to isolate manager performance. Consider
each component in turn.
2.2.1 Individual Player Performance
2.2.1.1 Model Specification
In order to establish an expected level of team performance, I need
to establish expected player performance. I generate expected player perfor-
mance levels by estimating a fixed effect regression for player performance.
The specification of the fixed effect equation is as follows:
yit = Xitβ + γi + εit (2.1)
where γi represents an individual-specific effect. For the equations I estimate,
yit is either a measure of hitting or pitching performance while Xit includes
both age and year dummy variables. There is a fixed effect for each individ-
uals in the sample. Estimating this equation establishes an age profile for all
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players while allowing the fixed effect to account for individual ability. The
year dummy variables account for any differences that may occur across years
and affect all of the players’ performances.4 Including a series of age dummy
variables allows flexibility in the age profile. The dummy groups are defined
as 19 or less, 42 and older, and each year of age in between.5
2.2.1.2 Player Data
The player data are in two parts: hitters and pitchers.6 The hitter data
include the standard hitting statistics: at-bats, hits, singles, doubles, triples,
home runs, base-on-balls, hit-by-pitches, sacrifices, stolen bases and the num-
ber of times caught stealing. The pitcher data include the standard pitching
statistics: wins, losses, strikeouts, earned runs allowed, innings pitched, hits
allowed, home runs allowed, and base-on-balls allowed. I use these data in
the fixed effects regressions for individual performance. The hitter regressions
include any player who had a plate appearance or who made an appearance
as a pinch runner between the years 1901 and 1996.7 The pitcher regressions
include any player that threw a pitch in a game between 1901 and 1996.8
The measure of performance I use in the hitter regressions accounts for
each opportunity a player has to achieve a base and each time a player costs
4An example is 1968, often referred to as ‘the year of the pitcher.’ Pitchers were so
dominant that rules were subsequently changed to benefit hitters.
5I use the ‘baseball age’ of each player, defined as age on July 1 of each year.
6Both parts of the data were compiled from two sources: Total Baseball (sixth ed.) and
from the website ‘The Baseball Archive’ (www.baseball1.com).
7I limit the sample to post-1901 because this is the first year that the American and the
National League coexisted.
8Seven players are not included in the sample because they have no reported age. Each
player played during 1901 or 1902 with only three of the players having a career of any
length.
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his team a base. I call this metric bases-per-chance (BPC).9 It is defined in
the following way:
BPC =
TB + BB + HBP + SF + SH + SB − CS
AB + BB + HBP + SF + SH + SB + CS
(2.2)
The numerator accounts for the total number of bases a player achieves for his
team. It includes the base value acquired for each hit (TB), each base-on-balls
(BB), each hit-by-pitch (HBP), each sacrifice fly (SF) and hit (SH), and each
stolen base (SB). The measure also takes a base away for each time a player
is caught stealing (CS). The denominator accounts for each opportunity the
player has to achieve a base. It includes each plate appearance (AB plus BB
plus HBP plus SF plus SH) as well as any time a player on a base attempts
to advance another base (SB plus CS). BPC is average bases advanced per
opportunity to advance bases.10
The measure of performance I use in the pitcher regression relates the
bases a pitcher allows to the opportunity hitters have to achieve bases at the
expense of the pitcher. Put simply, the metric is bases allowed per batter
faced.11 It is defined as follows:
BPBF =
(HA−HRA) ∗ (1B% + 2 ∗ 2B% + 3 ∗ 3B%) + 4 ∗HRA + BB
3 ∗ IP + HA + BB . (2.3)
9See Appendix A for a discussion of the process of choosing this measure over standard
measures of hitter performance.
10In some years, not all of the variables are available. SF were not recorded before 1954.
For the years pre-1954, I omit SF from the equation. Similarly, CS was not recorded pre-
1920 in the American League and was not recorded pre-1951 in the National League. In
these years, I omit both CS and SB to avoid crediting players with bases for stolen bases
without counting the bases lost through being caught stealing.
11See Appendix B for a discussion of the process of choosing this measure over standard
measures of pitcher performance.
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The pitching data do not include the base value for each hit allowed (HA).
It only includes the total number of hits allowed and the total number of
home runs allowed (HRA). In order to approximate the total bases allowed, I
calculated single, double, and triple rates for each year in the data set using the
hitter data (1B%, 2B%, 3B%, respectively). I used these rates to approximate
the base value of each hit allowed by a pitcher. The addition of base-on-balls
to this number mimics the corresponding numerator in hitter productivity
measure. The denominator approximates batters faced by the pitcher. Innings
pitched (IP) multiplied by three accounts for the fact that a pitcher at a
minimum must face three batters per inning. Each hit allowed and base-on-
balls increases the number of batters by one.12 This metric is the pitching
equivalent of the hitter productivity measure. The summary statistics for
bases earned, chances, BPC, bases allowed, batters faced, and BPBF are in
Table 2.1.
2.2.1.3 Player Regression Results
The hitter regression contains 59,020 observations from 11,425 different
individuals while the pitcher regression contains 28,152 observations with 5,889
different individuals. The overall R2 is .0206 for the hitter regression and .0287
for the pitcher regression. In both regressions, the effects of interest are best
shown using graphs. As such, I present Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 in lieu of a
table of coefficients.
In both the hitter and pitcher equations, I include dummy variables
12It is possible that a pitcher will not face more than three batters even if he allows a hit
or a base-on-balls because hitters sometimes hit into double (or triple) plays. However, the
pitching data do not include this information. It is in this sense that the denominator is an
approximation.
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for each age between 19 and 42. I include these variables in order to capture
the relationship between player production and age in an unrestrictive way.
In the hitter regression, I also include interaction terms between age and a
pitcher dummy variable. These interactions allow the age-hitter productivity
profile to differ for position players and pitchers. As can be seen in Figure
2.1, the age-hitting productivity profile has an inverse U-shape for position
players but not for pitchers.13 The position player graph increases early in the
career, remains relatively flat from ages 26 to 32,14 and then declines gradually
after 32.15 The pitcher graph has a sharp increase early in the career but then
remains relatively flat after age 24. This flatness could be to the fact that
pitchers do not specialize in hitting and therefore, experience no mid-career
decrease in hitting production.
The pitching productivity regression does not suggest a quadratic re-
lationship between age and pitching productivity. The graph is relatively flat
with a slight decline in performance with age, which is indicated by an increase
in the graph. The minimum of the age-productivity schedule occurs at age 20
with a slight non-monotonic increase, which indicates a performance decline,
through age 42. An F -test for joint significance of the age dummy variables
is not significant at any meaningful significance level.16 This result suggests
that there is not a relationship between age and pitching production. There
is a possible explanation for the difference between the age profile for pitching
13F( 23, 47358) = 25.24 (p-value = 0.000) for joint significance of the age dummy vari-
ables. F( 23, 47358) = 5.39 (p-value = 0.000) for joint significance of interaction terms.
F( 46, 47358) = 14.78 (p-value = 0.000) for joint significance of age dummy variables and
interaction terms.
14A test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on ages 26 through 32 are equal cannot be
rejected; F( 6, 47358) = 0.65 p-value = 0.6903.
15The peak age of production for position players is 29.
16F( 23, 22048) = 1.23. (p-value = 0.2042)
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skills and the age profile for hitting skills. Pitchers may develop skills over
their careers that compensate for any loss in physical ability. These skills may
include pitch control, pitch repertoire, and general ‘game management.’ In
contrast, hitting relies more upon strength and reflexes, which peak in early
years. This explanation suggests that effective pitching is more of a learned
skill than a physical talent.
In both the hitter and the pitcher equations, I include a series of dummy
variables that account for the differences between the American and National
League. I include a full set of league-year interaction terms. The interactions
allow the differences across the leagues to differ across years. The reason I
include the interaction terms is to account for the Designated Hitter rule. In
1973, the American League established a rule that allows one player to hit
in place of the pitcher without playing in the field. This rule allows Ameri-
can League pitchers to focus on pitching alone while certain American League
players can focus on hitting alone. The introduction of this rule should affect
any difference between the leagues. The direction of the effect depends on
the relative impact of improved hitting and improved pitching. The American
League post-1972 should have stronger pitchers since they can focus on pitch-
ing alone, which suggests that in the American League hitters would produce
less while pitchers produce more. However, the pitchers must face a lineup of
9 hitters, which suggests pitchers will produce less.17 The league dummy vari-
ables and the interactions account for any fundamental difference in pitcher
and hitter production across leagues and eras. However, I expect the leagues
to differ the most in the Designated Hitter era.18
17National League pitchers face 9 hitters but one of the hitters is the opposing pitcher.
As a general rule, pitchers are not strong hitters and as such, are easier to retire.
18In the hitter regression, I omit any pitchers who appeared as hitters or baserunners
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The year effects are plotted in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. The year dummy
variables are jointly significant at the one percent level.19 Similarly, the Amer-
ican League dummy variable and American League-Year interaction terms are
jointly significant at the one percent level.20 Also, the year dummy variables,
the American League dummy variable, and the American league-year interac-
tion terms are jointly significant.21 However, the graphs suggest that qualita-
tively there is little difference across the leagues.22 The largest difference across
the leagues should be in the designated hitter era (post-1972). However, the
null hypothesis that the post-1972 year-league interactions are jointly equal to
zero cannot be rejected in the pitcher regression and are only significant at the
7% level in the hitter regression.23 The only notable difference between the
leagues in the pitcher productivity graphs is the 1950s. During this time, the
National League exhibits a sharp decrease in productivity not evident in the
corresponding American League graph. The only notable difference between
the leagues in the hitter productivity graph is in the 1930s and late 1940s.
During this time, the American League exhibits a slight increase while the
National league exhibits a decrease. The American League does decrease but
much later in the 1930s. This difference may be a residual effect of World War
post-1972 since there are less than 7 chances per year by pitchers.
19F(95,47358) = 3.37 (p-value = 0.000) for the hitter regression and F( 95, 22048) = 3.63
(p-value = 0.000) for the pitcher regression.
20F( 96, 47358) = 1.81 (p-value = 0.000) for the hitter regression and F( 96, 22048) =
1.94 (p-value = 0.000) for the pitcher regression.
21F(191, 47358) = 3.45 (p-value = 0.000) for the hitter regression and F(191, 22048) =
3.81 (p-value = 0.000) for the pitcher regression.
22The mean of the difference between the year effects for hitter productivity is -.00692
with a standard deviation of .01995. Similarly, the mean of the difference between the year
effects for pitcher productivity is .0009 with a standard deviation of .0223.
23F(24, 22048) = 1.04 (p-value = 0.4082) for the pitcher regression and F(24, 47358) =
1.45 (p-value = 0.0726) for the hitter regression.
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II.
An important determinant of production in the equations described
above is the individual fixed effect of the players. The mean fixed effect in
the hitter equation is -.0444 with a standard deviation of .1778 while in the
pitcher equation the mean is .0196 with a standard deviation of .1201. In both
equations, the fixed effects pass an F-test for joint significance. This result
suggests that a portion of the variation in performance is due to individual
specific abilities. This result is intuitive. It is reasonable to expect different
players to produce at different levels throughout their careers.
I use the estimates from the player regressions to obtain predicted val-
ues of both hitter and pitcher productivity for each player. I then aggregate
the predicted values to obtain team expected performance levels. In order to
account for playing time, I weight each player’s predicted individual hitting
productivity by the number of chances and I weight each player’s predicted
individual pitching productivity by the number of batters faced. Thus, team
predicted hitting productivity is
B̂PCteam =
∑Nt
i=1 B̂PC it ∗ Cit∑Nt
i=1Cit
(2.4)
and team predicted pitching productivity is
B̂PBF team =
∑Nt
i=1 B̂PBF it ∗BFit∑Nt
i=1BFit
. (2.5)
Each of the predicted individual productivity levels reflect expected productiv-
ity conditional on age, year, league, and the player’s individual effect. These
values aggregated to the team level represent the offensive and pitching pro-
duction a team could expect at the beginning of a year given the players on
its roster.
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I also construct the actual hitter and pitcher productivity of a team
in a year from the individual productivity levels of the players on the team
during that year as follows:24
BPCteam =
∑Nt








The performance levels are constant for a team within a year, which implicitly
assumes that player composition is constant within a year. The aggregation
provides an opportunity to relate the probability team i beats team j to their
respective run-producing and run-preventing abilities in that year. The sum-
mary statistics for actual BPC and BPBF are in Table 2.2.
2.2.2 Team Win Probabilities
2.2.2.1 Model Specification
The second part of the econometric model is estimating how team hit-
ting and pitching productivity relate to wins. In doing this, I estimate a probit
equation for win on the actual productivity levels of teams in a given year.
The probit equation for whether a team wins is specified in the following way
for any pair of opponents in a game:
Pr(wH = 1) = Φ[α0 + β1 ∗XH + β2 ∗ YH + β3 ∗XV + β4 ∗ YV ] (2.8)
Pr(wV = 1) = Φ[−α0 + β1 ∗XV + β2 ∗ YV + β3 ∗XH + β4 ∗ YH ] (2.9)
= 1− Φ[α0 − β1 ∗XV − β2 ∗ YV − β3 ∗XH − β4 ∗ YH ]
24In the case of players who play for multiple teams during a year, only the production
recorded with the specific team counts in the aggregate team performance levels.
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where Φ represents the cumulative standard normal distribution function. X
and Y represent team productivity levels of hitting and pitching, respectively,
and the subscripts H and V represent the home and visiting teams, respectively.
β1 through β4 is the set of parameters to be estimated. α0 is a constant term
to be estimated and reflects the possible presence of a home team advantage.
I impose the following restriction in the estimation to ensure that Pr(wH =
1) + Pr(wV = 1) = 1:
−β1 = β3 (2.10)
−β2 = β4
This restriction yields:
Pr(wH = 1) = Φ[α0 + β1 ∗ (XH −XV ) + β2 ∗ (YH − YV )] (2.11)
Pr(wV = 1) = Φ[−α0 + β1 ∗ (XV −XH) + β2 ∗ (YV − YH)] (2.12)
Equation [2.11] and equation [2.12] imply that the probability of winning de-
pends on the differences in the teams’ hitting and pitching productivity and
any home field effects. I estimate these equations below.
2.2.2.2 Win Probit Results
In estimating win probabilities, I use a simple account of 115,728 regular
season MLB games between 1923 and 1996 and the constructed actual hitting
and pitching productivity described in the previous section.25 The summary
statistics for the difference variables used in the team probit equations are
presented in Table 2.2. The results of the estimation are presented in Table
25The individual game data was obtained free of charge from and is copyrighted by Ret-
rosheet. Interested parties may contact Retrosheet at 20 Sunset Rd., Newark, DE 19711.
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2.3. The significance and positive sign of the constant term suggest a home
team advantage. A home team that is playing an equally talented team such
that the hitting productivity and the pitching productivity differentials both
equal zero has just over a .54 probability of winning. A home team that has
a one standard deviation advantage in hitting productivity but is otherwise
equally talented as the visitor has just under a .62 probability of winning.
Similarly, a home team that has a one standard deviation advantage in pitching
productivity but is otherwise equally talented as the visitor has just over a .59
probability of winning. If the visitor has a one standard deviation advantage
in hitting productivity and the teams are otherwise equally talented then the
home team has just under a .47 probability of winning. Finally, a home team
that is at a one standard deviation disadvantage in pitching productivity but
is otherwise equally talented has just over a .49 probability of winning. The
estimated model passes a simple F-test for joint significance and supports
the conjecture that team levels of hitting and pitching productivity affect the
probability of winning.26
I use the coefficients on BPC, BPBF, and the constant term to construct
expected win probabilities for a team in each game in each year. These win
probabilities are constant across games between teams within a year and with
the same home team but will differ by year, team pair, and home team. I use
the win probabilities to construct three expected winning percentages. These
expected winning percentages are then used in the termination equation to
isolate manager input to production.
26I also estimated the model with an interaction term. The interaction term took the form
BPCi ∗BPBFj −BPCj ∗BPBFi and accounted for any effect the relative levels of hitting
productivity and pitching productivity had on the probability of winning. The coefficient
on the term was insignificant.
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The first expected win probability for game g, Ŵ IN1,g, takes the fol-
lowing form:
Ŵ IN1,g = Φ[α̂ + β̂1(BPCi,t −BPCj,t) + β̂2(BPBFi,t −BPBFj,t)] (2.13)
where Φ represents the standard normal distribution function, BPC and BPBF
are actual current year performance levels of both the home team (i) and its
opponents (j ) in year t, and α̂, β̂1, and β̂2 are obtained from the estimation of
equation [2.11]. This win probability represents the predicted game outcome
given the actual productivity levels of the teams in year t.
The second expected win probability for game g, Ŵ IN2, takes the
following form:
Ŵ IN2,g = Φ[α̂ + β̂1(B̂PCi,t − B̂PCj,t) + β̂2( ̂BPBFi,t − ̂BPBFj,t)] (2.14)
where Φ, α̂, β̂1, and β̂2 are again obtained from equation [2.11] and B̂PC
and B̂PBF are the expected team productivity in equations [2.4] and [2.5],
respectively. This win probability reflects the expected game outcome if all
members of each team performed at their predicted levels in year t as derived
from the individual player regressions. The distinction between Ŵ IN1 and
Ŵ IN2 is important. The latter is the win probability for the home team if
all players on both teams performed at their expected levels in year t. The
former is the win probability for the home team given the actual performance
level of all players on both teams in year t.
The third expected win probability for game g, Ŵ IN IS, takes the fol-
lowing form:
Ŵ INIS,g = Φ[α̂ + β̂1( ̂BPCi,t−k − B̂PCj,t) + β̂2( ̂BPBFi,t−k − ̂BPBFj,t) (2.15)
where Φ, α̂, β̂1, and β̂2 are defined as before, B̂PCt and B̂PBFt are defined
as before, and B̂PCt−k and ̂BPBFt−k are expected team productivity levels
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given the players on the home team (i), k periods ago.27 This win probability
represents the predicted game outcome for the home team given the expected
performance levels of the players on the home team t-k periods ago. Each
of the expected win probabilities presented above can be used to construct








where G is the number of games managed and z is either 1, 2, or IS.
2.2.3 Manager Regression
2.2.3.1 Model Specification
The final step in the estimation is the hazard for manager termination.
The hazard specified here follows the proportional hazard suggested by Cox
(1972). It is factored as follows:
λ(t, x, β, λ0) = λ0(t)λ1(x, β) (2.17)
where λ0 is the baseline hazard, x is a vector of possibly time-varying explana-
tory variables, and β is a vector of coefficients. Specifying the hazard in this
way, allows for flexibility in the form of the baseline hazard by allowing for








27In the hazard estimation, k is chosen so that the team is composed of the existing
players just prior to the beginning of a manager’s spell. The variable is described in further
detail in the next section.
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where N is the set of ordered failures, i is the individual whose spell is com-
pleted at time t, and j represents the individuals at risk at time t. This form
allows for parametric estimation of λ1 without direct specification of λ0. I
specify λ1(x,β) = exp
xiβ, which implies that






and therefore β can be interpreted as the constant proportional effect of a unit
change in x on the conditional probability of ending a spell.
A simple specification of the covariate vector includes variables such
as manager experience, dummy variables for the occurrences of the all-star
break and the end of the season, and the manager’s actual winning percentage
to date .28 However, this specification is naive; it does not account for the
fact that different managers control teams of different aggregate quality. In
order to account for the differences in team quality across managers, I prefer
a specification that replaces actual winning percentage with expected winning
percentage given team quality at time of hire and several measures of the
manager’s ‘excess winning percentage.’ In particular, note that cumulative
winning percentage through game G can be written in the following form:
28The all-star break and end-of-season dummy variables account for periods of time when
the costs associated with manager turnover are lowest. As such, teams should be more

































WPCT =(WPCT − ŴPCT 1) + (ŴPCT 1 − ŴPCT 2) (2.21)
+ (ŴPCT 2 − ŴPCT IS) + (ŴPCT IS)
Each of the individual terms on the right hand side of equation [2.20] are win-
ning percentages as defined in equation [2.16] and correspond to the terms in
[2.21]. The first term on the right hand side represents the cumulated difference
between the manager’s actual winning percentage and the manager’s expected
winning percentage given the actual performance of the players on his team.
The second term represents the cumulated difference between the manager’s
expected winning percentage given the actual performance of the players on
his team and the manager’s expected winning percentage given the ex ante
expected performance of the players on his team. The third term represents
the cumulated difference between the manager’s expected winning percentage
given the ex ante expected performance of the players on his team and the
manager’s expected winning percentage given ex ante expected performance
of the players present on the team prior to the beginning of a manager’s spell
with that team. The last term represents the manager’s expected winning
percentage given ex ante expected performance of the players present on the
team prior to the beginning of a manager’s spell with that team. Consider
each of the measures in turn.
WPCT is the manager’s actual cumulative winning percentage. ŴPCT 1
is the expected cumulative winning percentage given the actual performance
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level of players across seasons. The difference between these two variables ar-
guably reflects both managerial ability and purely random events. The man-
agerial ability present in this variable is likely due to in-game decisions while
the random events include randomness in the distribution of runs scored and
runs allowed across games.29 ŴPCT 2 is the expected winning percentage
given the ex ante expected performance of players. It represents the team’s
productivity if all players performed at their expected levels.30 This will dif-
fer from expected winning percentage given actual player productivity if many
players perform better (or worse) than expected in a given season, which could
be due to either manager ability or random fluctuation. Here, manager ability
likely takes the form of any training effect a manager has on player perfor-
mance, including activities such as a player’s off-season workout program (or
lack thereof), as well as diagnosing and correcting any loss of form. ŴPCT IS
is the expected winning percentage for a team in year t given player com-
position just prior to the manager’s arrival. Therefore, the final difference
(ŴPCT 2 − ŴPCT IS) reflects any effect a manager has on input composi-
tion. The manager has no control over the initial stock of talent of a team
but subsequent roster decisions likely include the manager’s input. Including
the initial stock of talent separately as an explanatory variable accounts for a
factor that is unrelated to the manager’s performance and presumably can be
filtered out. If this variable has a role in the retention decision it will suggest
that firms hold managers accountable for measured performance that does not
reflect a manager’s ability or effort.
29An in-game decision that may have zero net effect on runs allowed and runs scored over
the course of the season but may redistribute both advantageously is the removal of star
pitchers and star hitters in a game that is lopsided.
30The expected levels are based on the player’s age and estimated age-productivity profile.
See section 2.2.1.1 for a complete description of the estimation.
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It is important to note two points about the specification presented
above. First, there is no reason to expect each of the variables to contain the
same amount of information about managerial ability. Consequently, there is
no reason to expect that a unit change in the variables has the same effect on
the termination hazard. In particular, since ŴPCT IS depends on the team
composition prior to the manager’s arrival one might expect the coefficient on
this variable to equal zero whereas the coefficients on the other variables should
presumably be negative since they contain information about the manager’s
ability. Second, the performance measures are cumulative across all prior
spells. Cumulating the measures in this way gives equal weight to each game
managed and implicitly assumes that information regarding manager perfor-
mance is publicly observable and that managerial ability is time-invariant.
2.2.3.2 Manager Data
The manager data contains work histories of MLB managers from 1950
to 1996.31 For each manager-team-year observation, the data includes the
number of wins, losses, and total games managed within the year. It also
includes the cumulative number of games managed over the manager-team
spell (tenure) and the cumulative games managed over the manager’s career
(experience). An attractive piece of information in the data is the information
regarding spell endings; each spell ending is identified as either a fire or a
quit. I obtained this information from the manager files available at the A.
Bartlett Giamatti Research Center located at the Baseball Hall of Fame.32
31The manager work histories are from Total Baseball through 1992 and updated through
1996 from the website ‘Baseball Reference’ (www.baseballreference.com).
32I am grateful to Claudette Burke and Rachael Kepner of the A. Bartlett Giamatti
Research Center at the Baseball Hall of Fame for providing me access to the data.
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Each of the files contains newspaper clippings that report events in the career
of the manager that allow quits to be distinguished from firings. Since I am
interested in estimating the determinants of firing, distinguishing quits from
fires is useful.33
The manager data contain 252 different managers involved in 447 dif-
ferent manager-team spells. Of these 447 spells, 339 end by a fire. Of the
remaining 108, 86 end by a quit with 22 censored observations in 1996. Table
2.4 presents the time pattern of spell endings.
2.2.3.3 Manager Hazard Results
Table 2.5 presents the summary statistics for each of the excess per-
formance measures as well as the initial stock of talent. As presented, each
of the 818 observations are single complete seasons and represent the typical
year. I use the stadard deviations from this table to illustrate the relative
magnitudes of the effects of interest. Table 2.6 presents the results of the
proportional hazard estimation. Kiefer (1988) offers that the interpretation
of the coefficients depends significantly on the functional form. However, the
specification of λ1 = exp
xitβ allows an interpretation of the coefficients analo-
gous to the interpretation of the linear model. A negative (positive) sign on
a coefficient suggests that an increase in the variable increases (decreases) the
expected duration of a spell. Furthermore, it is important to note that the ex-
planatory variables are measured in levels. This convention allows the hazard
33Some discretion was necessary in the assignment of fires and quits. There are nine
situations where a manager is refused a new contract. These situations are classified as fires
since the team chose not to renew the contract and the manager subsequently quit. The four
managerial trades are also classified as fires. The three managerial deaths are classified as
quits, as are the four situations where the manager is also the general manager and replaces
himself with a new manager.
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where λ1(·) = 1 to be interpreted as the case where a team is performing at
expected levels, random effects are zero, and the manager has not contributed
to production.
The first column of Table 2.6 presents the results of the hazard esti-
mation that assumes firms weight information about a manager’s performance
equally regardless of when that information was acquired. The results sug-
gest that the time in the season is an important determinant of termination.
The coefficients on the all-star break and end-of-season dummy variables are
significant at the 1% level. Other things equal, the hazard ratio rises by a
factor of 5.1 at the all-star break and rises by a factor of 132 at the end of the
season. This result suggests that firms take advantage of the situations when
the cost of manager turnover is lowest. The presumption is that search costs
and production losses are at a minimum during all-star breaks and at the end
of seasons.
Each of the coefficients on the excess performance measures are signif-
icant at the 5% significance level. These measures each carry negative signs.
This result is expected since better performance should reduce the likelihood
of termination. The results indicate that, in making retention decisions, firms
consider not only factors attributable to the manager but also a factor not at-
tributable to the manager (inherited team quality) that could be filtered out.
Since the excess performance measures are partly influenced by a manager’s
contribution to production, the significance of the coefficients suggests that
firms make retention decisions based in part on manager performance. How-
ever, I constructed the variable ŴPCT IS to represent the expected winning
percentage of a team given the player composition prior to a manager’s hire.
This variable is a measure of performance that is unrelated to a manager’s
28
performance and should be filtered out of the performance measure used to
make the retention decision. An alternative interpretation of the significance
of this coefficient is that managers with high unobserved ability are matched
with high quality teams.
Figures 2.4-2.7 illustrate the relative magnitudes of the effects of the
managerial performance variables and how they change with prior experience.
In particular, I consider the effect of managerial performance in the current
year that is at the sample mean, that is one standard deviation above the
sample mean, and that is one standard deviation below the sample mean,
assuming that managerial performance in all prior years was exactly at the
sample mean. The four figures correspond to the four different performance
measures.34 Each graph in each figure shows the risk of termination relative
to a manager with no prior experience who performed at the sample mean
in his first year. The solid line represents the relative termination hazard at
each experience level given average current year performance. The dashed line
gives the relative termination hazard at each experience level for a manager
who performs one standard deviation above the mean level in the current year.
The dotted line gives the relative termination hazard at each experience level
for a manager who performs one standard deviation below the mean level in
34The predicted values are each expXβ and are calculated using the following formula:
exp{[( tt+1 ) ∗X + ( 1t+1 )(X ± s.d.(x))] ∗ β̂1 + (t) ∗ β̂2}
exp{X ∗ β̂1}
(2.22)
where t is years of prior experience, X is mean performance level, according to one of the
performance measures, s.d.(x) is the standard deviation of the performance measure, over a
season, β̂1 is the estimated coefficient for the performance measure, and β̂2 is the estimated
coefficient on prior experience. For simplicity in the calculations, I assume that in each prior
year the manager performs at the mean level for a 162 game season and that it is neither
the all-star break nor the end of the season.
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the current year.
Figure 2.4 presents the effect of the difference between the actual win-
ning percentage of the team and the expected winning percentage given the
actual performance of its players. The solid line represents a ‘pure’ experi-
ence effect. The negative slope suggests that as managers gain experience the
likelihood of termination decreases. The standard deviation of experience is
722 games. For a manager that lasts one standard deviation longer (roughly
4 years), the likelihood of firing decreases by 12.3%. The coefficient on ex-
perience is not significant at conventional significance levels but does suggest
that managers acquire skills through work and as a result are less likely to be
fired. The insignificance of the coefficient mirrors the result in Audas et al
(1999). The authors find that in a sample of English Soccer coaches experi-
ence does not play a role in the firing of managers.35 This effect is depicted
in each of the figures. The coefficient on the difference between the actual
winning percentage of the team and the expected winning percentage given
the actual performance of its players is roughly -1.3. If a manager with no
prior experience increases this first measure of excess winning percentage by
one standard deviation (.0399, 6.5 games) the hazard ratio shifts down by
5.05%.36 A corresponding one standard deviation decrease in this measure
of excess winning percentage results in a 5.32% increase in the hazard. The
magnitude of this effect decreases as experience increases. A manager with
35The authors do find a significant effect of experience on voluntary turnover and suggest
that experienced managers are desirable in the market. A significant effect of experience
on voluntary turnover also seems to suggest that experienced managers retire of their own
volition rather than by involuntary termination.
36The means and standard deviations used in these calculations are constructed using
outcomes from single, complete years. There are 818 incidences of a manager starting a
year and managing all of a team’s games within that year. The summary statistics are
presented in table 2.5.
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3 years of prior experience that increases this measure of excess winning per-
centage by one standard deviation decreases the hazard by only 1.28%. This
effect diminishes to a .7% decrease in the hazard for a manager with 6 years of
experience. The corresponding standard deviation decreases in this measure
of excess winning percentage result in a 1.3% and .7% increase in the hazard
for a manager with 3 and 6 years of experience, respectively. These results
suggest that firms decide to retain managers based on what can be attributed
to either managerial in-game ability or luck over the entire career and that the
hazard is less sensitive to performance realizations at higher experience levels.
If this variable reflects more managerial ability than randomness we would
expect firms to use this measure to make retention decisions. If the opposite is
true we would expect firms to be less sensitive to this measure of performance.
Relative to the other measures of excess winning percentage, termination is
insensitive to deviations in this measure. This result indicates that it contains
the most noise of any of the measures.
Figure 2.5 presents the effect of players over-performing their expected
levels through manager led training (or other training).37 The sign on this
coefficient indicates that an increase in the variable shifts the hazard down. An
increase of one standard deviation (.0422, 6.8 games) in the second measure of
excess winning percentage shifts the hazard ratio down by 26.8%. A decrease of
one standard deviation in this measure increases the hazard ratio by 36.6%. As
a manager’s experience increases the effect of this measure diminishes as well.
At 3 years of experience, a one standard deviation increase in this measure
shifts the hazard down by only 7.5% while a one standard deviation decrease
37Other training may include such things as independent off-season workouts or the ab-
sence of the same.
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in this measure increases the hazard by only 8.1%. At 6 years of experience,
a one standard deviation increase in this measure shifts the hazard down by
only 4.3% while a one standard deviation decrease in this measure increases
the hazard by 4.6%.
The third measure of excess winning percentage reflects the cumulative
effect a manager has on player performance levels as well as any managerial de-
cisions regarding input composition. The coefficient on this variable is roughly
-6.2. Figure 2.6 presents the relative magnitude of this effect. Increasing this
measure by one standard deviation (.0615, 10 games) shifts the hazard down
by a factor of 31.7% while decreasing it by one standard deviation increases the
hazard by 46.4%. At 3 years of experience, a one standard deviation increase
in this measure shifts the hazard down by only 9.1% while a one standard
deviation decrease in this measure increases the hazard by only 10%. At 6
years of experience, a one standard deviation increase in this measure shifts
the hazard down by only 5.3% while a one standard deviation decrease in this
measure increases the hazard by 5.6%. At low experience levels, this measure
exhibits the largest difference in the likelihood of termination between man-
agers that perform one standard deviation above the mean and managers that
perform one standard deviation below the mean. This measure reflects the
cumulative effect a manager has on input composition. The result indicates
that this measure has the least noise. This is reasonable since teams know
whether or not they used a manager’s suggestion when adding or subtracting
a player from the roster.
It is reasonable to assume that a manager has no effect on team com-
position prior to the date of hire. As such, one might expect the risk of
termination to be independent of the team’s talent level at the time of hire.
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By including the expected winning percentage given expected performance of
the players present on the team prior to the beginning of a manager’s spell
with that team (ŴPCT IS), I can test whether termination decisions are partly
based on factors that do not reflect manager ability and should be filtered out
of the decision process. The significance of the coefficient on this variable sug-
gests that the risk of termination is partly based on a performance measure
that is not attributable to manager ability, namely the initial expected perfor-
mance of inputs prior to the manager’s arrival. The coefficient suggests that
a one standard deviation (.0612, 10 games) increase in inherited team quality
shifts the hazard down by a factor of 19.2% (Figure 2.7) while a decrease in
inherited team quality shifts the hazard up by 23.7%. Managers that begin
spells with teams that have high levels of talent are less likely to be fired than
those who do not.
2.2.3.4 Alternative Specification
The results in the first column of table 2.6 are suggestive but the model
is restrictive. It assumes that firms do not distinguish between information
acquired from different points in a manager’s career. An alternative specifica-
tion would allow firms to treat information from different points in a manager’s
career differently. Consider the following identity:




) ∗ (WPCT − ŴPCT 1)within spell.
Equation [2.23] splits the information contained in the career form of the first
excess winning percentage (WPCT − ŴPCT 1) into a pre-spell portion and a
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current spell portion. This decomposition applies for each of the performance
variables. A specification that enters the two terms on the right hand side
of equation [2.23] as separate explanatory variables allows the possibility that
a firm’s use of information about manager performance depends on whether
the information was acquired while the manager was with the team or while
the manager was with another team. If there is a significant privately ob-
served component in the performance variables, firms will weight information
acquired during the current spell more heavily than information acquired in
prior spells with other teams.38 The simple specification in column 1 of table
2.6 can be tested by a simple test of equality of the coefficients on each of the
two terms.39 In this case, the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal
maintains that the cumulative career values of the performance variables are
what is relevant in the retention decision.
The second column of table 2.6 presents the results of the alternative
specification (2). This specification includes each of the ‘excess performance’
variables included in specification (1) decomposed as described in equation
[2.23]. Each of the coefficients on the within spell variations of the excess
performance variables are significant at the 5% level. The coefficients are all
38The private component of the information may include work habits of the manager or
the manager’s interaction with players. Presumably, this information may also help the
firm distinguish between the manager’s effect on player performance levels and the effects
of individual player’s work habits.
39As a practical matter, some managers are in their first spell in the data. In these cases,
I impute the values of the pre-spell differences to be zero. This restriction emphasizes that
firms know very little (in fact nothing) about a manager’s ability before the manager is
actually working. This restriction follows from Jovanovic (1979). In this paper, the author
posited that labor is an experience good. In this sense, neither the worker nor the firm
knows the yield of the relationship at the outset. Over time both acquire the necessary
information. It is possible that firms observe a manager’s ability prior to the manager’s
appearance in the data set by observing a manager’s performance realizations from another
baseball league (Japanese, College, or Minor League Baseball).
34
negative implying that better performance according to each measure lowers
the termination hazard, as does inheriting a more talented team. The results
also indicate that firms consider pre-spell information. The null hypothesis
that the coefficients on the pre-spell versions of the variables are jointly equal
to zero can be rejected (χ2(4) = 11.90, p-value = 0.0181). These estimated
coefficients are also negative although only two of the individual coefficients
on the pre-spell versions of the performance variables are significant.
An important aspect of specification (2) is that it allows a simple test
of whether or not firms treat information from prior spells and current spells
equally. Equality of the coefficients within a variable pair suggests that firms
weight current and prior spell information equally. The joint hypothesis that
the coefficients on the current spell performance variable and prior spell per-
formance variable are equal for each of the four performance measures cannot
be rejected.40 This result is consistent with the notion that firms weight in-
formation regarding manager performance equally regardless of what firm the
manager was with at the time of the performance realization.41 Thus, one
cannot reject the specification of the hazard presented in column one of table
2.6.
2.2.3.5 Manager Rehire Results
The results presented in table 2.6 suggest that managers are terminated
partly on factors beyond their control. A simple examination of the robustness
of this result is to consider the factors that affect the hiring decision firms
40The χ24 statistic for this test is 2.93 with a p-value = 0.5699.
41I also tested the equality of each pair independently. I could not reject the null hypoth-
esis that the coefficients were equal except for the pair of initial stock of talent variables
(ŴPCT IS) but the standard errors are relatively large.
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face. For this estimation, I consider the same sample of managers used in the
retention estimation. The only difference in the sample is that the 22 managers
who have jobs at the end of the 1996 season and the three managers whose last
spells were ended by their death are not considered as possible new hires. This
restriction limits the sample to 422 endings with 206 rehires.42 The model I
estimate is the hazard model presented and utilized in the previous sections.
In this case, the estimation considers the length of ‘unemployment’ a manager
endures after a job ending.43 I consider the length of unemployment spell as
the number of games played between the end of a manager’s last spell and the
beginning of a new spell.
Table 2.8 presents the results of the estimation using the career specifi-
cation of the variables. The results suggest that firms consider only some of the
measures of excess winning percentage in the rehire decision. The coefficient
on the first measure of excess winning percentage is 1.297. A one standard
deviation increase (0.112) over a career results in a 15.6% increase in the like-
lihood of rehire.44 This coefficient indicates that firms use information about
manager performance that is attributable to in-game decisions or randomness.
The coefficient on the second measure of excess winning percentage is 8.43.
A one standard deviation (0.031) increase in this measure of excess winning
percentage over a career results in an 30% increase in the likelihood of rehire.
The coefficient on the third measure of excess performance is 4.56. A one stan-
42The 206 rehires include managers who were rehired more than once. In these cases,
each ‘unemployment’ spell is considered independently.
43All managers who are alive at the time of a job opportunity are considered as a possible
rehire. Managers who are not rehired by the time of their death are considered censored.
Similarly, managers who have not been rehired by the end of the 1996 season are considered
censored.
44The summary statistics for the set of regressors in the rehire estimation are presented
in table 2.7.
36
dard deviation increase in this measure (.0385) over a career results in a 19.2%
increase in the likelihood of rehire. These results indicate that firms consider
excess winning percentage that is attributable to both players over-performing
due to training and the effect a manager has on input composition.
I found that the initial stock of talent had a significant effect on the
likelihood of being fired. This result suggests that firms do not filter a measure
of performance that is unrelated to manager performance. The same result is
not evident in the estimation of the likelihood of being rehired. The coefficient
is 1.985. It suggests that a one standard deviation (.053) increase in this
measure increases the likelihood of rehire by 11.2%. However, the coefficient
is estimated imprecisely and I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect.
The results also suggest that experience has an important role in deter-
mining whether a manager gets rehired. An increase of one standard deviation
(841) in experience increases the likelihood of rehire by almost 65.7%. This
result supports the idea that managers acquire human capital over their ca-
reers. However, the likelihood of rehire decreases by 45.2% if a manager is
one standard deviation (7.5) older at the time of of last job separation. The
coefficient on FIRE suggests that managers who were fired from their last job
are more likely to get rehired. However, this coefficient is not significant at
an acceptable significance level. The last explanatory variable is a dummy
variable that equals one if an off-season has passed since the manager has last
managed. The coefficient on this variable is -2.27 and suggests that having an
off-season pass without a new job decreases the likelihood of rehire by almost
90%.45
45There are 23 incidents of managers who do not have an off-season pass. 10 of these
are managers who were fired during 1996, the last year of the sample. The remaining 13
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It is useful to address the similarities and differences in the results of
the termination and rehire estimations. The estimations indicate that more
experienced managers are both less likely to be fired and more likely to be
rehired. This result supports the notion that managers acquire human capital
throughout their careers. The first measure of excess performance appears to
have a role in both the termination decision and the rehire decision. Since this
excess performance measure is attributable to in-game decisions and random-
ness, this result is not surprising. It is reasonable that this measure includes
a significant amount of information about manager ability. However, this
measure contains a significant amount of randomness. As such, teams may
discount this information. The results from both estimations suggest that
teams put the least weight on this information and is consistent with theory.
Both estimations also agree in the role of the second and third measure of
excess performance. The estimations suggest that excess performance due to
either manager-led training or input composition decreases the likelihood of
termination and increases the likelihood of rehire. The results of the estima-
tion disagree on the role of the initial stock of talent on a team prior to the
manager’s hire. The termination estimation suggests that undertaking a job
with a poor performing team is costly since the likelihood of termination is
higher, all else equal. However, the rehire estimation suggests this cost does
not carry over to the likelihood of rehire. One potential interpretation of the
coefficient on the expected winning percentage given expected performance of
the players present on the team prior to the beginning of the manager’s spell
( ̂WPCTIS) is that it accounts for unobserved ability. That is, managers who
undertake jobs with poor teams are less able in ways not accounted for by
managers were rehired within the season of their last spell ending.
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the excess performance measures. But if so, this variable should also reduce
the rehire likelihood of managers that ended spells with poor quality teams.
However, the rehire estimation suggests that it does not have an effect on the
likelihood of rehire. The disparity in the results suggest that the ‘unobserved
ability’ explanation of the inherited team quality variable may not be valid.
Therefore, rehire decisions appear to be rational in the sense that teams filter
out information that is unrelated to manager performance. In contrast, ter-
mination decisions appear not to be rational in the sense that teams do not
filter out information unrelated to manager performance.
2.3 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined the retention and rehire decisions firms make
regarding field managers in Major League Baseball. The evidence from both
estimations indicate that teams use multiple measures of performance in termi-
nation and rehire decisions. Each measure of performance presented plausibly
contains information on manager ability. The estimated coefficients on the
variables have expected signs and substantial magnitudes. Furthermore, the
estimated coefficients support the notion that the informational content dif-
fers across the performance variables. However, the results of the termination
estimation also suggest that teams use information that is unlikely to reflect
managerial ability. That is, talent at the time of hire affects the risk of termi-
nation, even after conditioning on team performance relative to expectations
after the date of hire. Since the rehire estimation does not support this result,
it appears that rehire decisions are rational while termination decisions are
not. The estimates from the termination equation suggest managers with no
prior experience face a likelihood of termination that is reduced by 19.2% if
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they begin spells with teams that are more talented than the average by one
standard deviation. This result suggests managers should receive a premium
for beginning spells with low talent teams since the likelihood of fire is higher
and raises questions about whether baseball teams make rational termination
decisions. Garen (1994) and Hall and Leibman (1998) found that firms do not
use relative performance evaluation to shield CEOs from common risk while
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) found that firms reward CEOs for observ-
able ‘luck.’ The results presented in this paper are comparable to both Hall
and Leibman (1998) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) since the observ-
able measure of team performance unrelated to manager performance was not
filtered out of the termination decision.
It should be noted that the analysis presented here relies upon infor-
mation that is not available for most CEOs or high-level managers. Given the
availability of the information, one would expect firms to shield managers from
performance measures that are not attributable to the manager. I found, in
termination decisions, that firms do not. Finding this result in the presence of
the available information suggests that contracts for high-level managers are
more complicated than standard contract theory allows for. One complication
not considered by the standard model is the importance of ‘public percep-
tion.’ In situations where agents are recognizable to the public (CEOs, fund
managers, etc) and principals rely upon the public for revenue (investment
decisions for a fund, etc), it may be optimal for principals to act as if the
agent is responsible for a poor outcome if the public perceives it to be true.
This complication may play an important role in the findings presented in this
paper.
Furthermore, the results presented here are for a specific labor market
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relationship. This relationship carries aspects that are unlikely to be found in
other relationships. As such, the results should be cautiously applied to other
labor market relationships. Despite this caveat, this paper does have signifi-
cant contributions to the literature. The nature of the job of Major League
Baseball manager shares many things in common with CEOs and other high-
level and high-profile managers and the analysis provides valuable information
regarding the turnover of the same. The similarities include the difficulty
in determining the input and the performance of the manager since observ-
able output is highly correlated with subordinate performance. Understanding
firms action under these conditions is valuable in the study of the market for
high-level managers. I exploited the high-frequency data available regarding
Major League Baseball managers to isolate a manager’s contribution to pro-
duction. In doing so, this paper provides a clear evaluation of hypotheses
suggested by theory.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Player Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
BASES EARNED 82.3452 106.5812 -2 610 59020
CHANCES 187.159 217.5234 0 874 59020
BPC 0.3545 0.1825 -1 4 59020
BASES ALLOWED 130.2667 115.777 0 552.0728 28152
BATTERS FACED 394.6304 357.1044 1 1802 28152
BPBF 0.3474 0.1129 0 4 28152
The data in this table is the set of all Major League Baseball players from 1901-1996.




where TB is the total base value
of all hits accrued, BB is base on balls, HBP is hit-by-pitches, SF is sacrifice flies, SH is sacrifice




3∗IP+HA+BB where HA is hits allowed, HRA is home runs al-
lowed, BB is base on balls, IP is innings pitched, and 1B%, 2B%, 3B% represent the percentage
of hits within that are singles, doubles and triples, respectively.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Team Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
BPC 0.4471 0.0302 0.3575 0.5488 115728
BPBF 0.3372 0.0239 0.2666 0.4453 115728
BPCi −BPCj 0 0.0345 -0.1311 0.1311 115728
BPBFi −BPBFj 0 0.0242 -0.1017 0.1017 115728
The sample represents the 115,728 regular season Major League Baseball games that oc-
curred between 1923 and 1996. In this table, BPC and BPBF represent the team levels






















Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**,*** represent significance at the
90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively. The estimation includes all games
between 1923 and 1996. However, only home teams are used. As such,
the constant is interpretable as a home team advantage. BPC and BPBF








Table 2.4: Empirical Hazard of Job Ending,
by Type of Job Ending
Year of Risk Set Quit Quit Fire Fire Censor
Spell during end of during end of
1 447 4 13 61 72 8
2 289 6 10 52 22 5
3 194 8 12 43 21 0
4 110 5 10 21 10 3
5 61 2 1 13 5 2
6 38 2 1 2 3 1
7 29 2 0 4 1 1
8 21 0 2 3 1 1
9 14 0 1 2 2 0
10 9 1 1 0 0 0
11 7 0 1 0 0 1
12 5 0 0 0 1 0
15 4 0 1 0 0 0
17 3 0 1 0 0 0
21 2 1 0 0 0 0
23 1 1 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 0 32 54 201 138 22
This table presents the nature and timing of spell endings for Major League Baseball managers
between 1950 and 1996. The data was constructed from the manager files available at the
A. Bartlett Giamatti Research Center located at the Baseball Hall of Fame. Some discretion
was necessary in the assignment of fires and quits. There are nine situations where a manager
is refused a new contract. These situations are classified fires since the team chose not to
renew the contract and the manager subsequently quit. The four managerial trades are also
classified as fires. The three managerial deaths are classified as quits, as are the four situations
where the manager is also general manager and replaces himself with a new manager.
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics - Hazard Regression
Single Year Outcomes
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
WPCT − ŴPCT 1 0.0037 0.0399 -0.1241 0.103 818
ŴPCT 1 − ŴPCT 2 0.0034 0.0422 -0.1422 0.1381 818
ŴPCT 2 − ŴPCT IS 0.0022 0.0615 -0.1925 0.2334 818
ŴPCT IS 0.4989 0.0612 0.2844 0.6919 818
The 818 observations are single complete seasons by managers between 1950 and 1996. A
complete season is defined by the total games a team played within a year. Each of the
variables is a measure of excess winning percentage. WPCT − \WPCT 1 is the difference
between the actual winning percentage and the expected winning percentage given the actual
performance of the players on the team; \WPCT 1 − \WPCT 2 is the difference between the
expected winning percentage given the actual performance of the players on the team and
the expected winning percentage given the ex ante expected performance of the players on
the team; \WPCT 2 − \WPCT IS is the difference between the expected winning percentage
given the ex ante expected performance of the players on the team and the expected winning
percentage given the expected performance of the players present on the team prior to the
beginning of a manager’s spell; \WPCT IS is the expected winning percentage given the
expected performance of the players present on the team prior to the beginning of a manager’s
spell.
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Table 2.6: Hazard Estimation
FIRE FIRE
(1) (2)
WPCT - ŴPCT 1 -1.2972∗∗ .
(.6032)
ŴPCT 1 − ŴPCT 2 -7.3924∗∗∗ .
(1.8957)
ŴPCT 2 − ŴPCT IS -6.1946∗∗∗ .
(1.6056)
ŴPCT IS -3.4749∗∗ .
(1.3992)
( current gamestotal games )*(WPCT - ŴPCT 1) within spell . -1.3149
∗∗
(.5851)
( current gamestotal games )*(ŴPCT 1 − ŴPCT 2) within spell . -7.4629∗∗∗
(1.8905)
( current gamestotal games )*(ŴPCT 2 − ŴPCT IS) within spell . -5.155∗∗∗
(1.6354)
( current gamestotal games )*(ŴPCT IS) within spell . -3.2798
∗∗
(1.3894)
(pre-spell gamestotal games )*(WPCT - ŴPCT 1) prior to spell . -.2123
(3.586)
(pre-spell gamestotal games )*(ŴPCT 1 − ŴPCT 2) prior to spell . -5.8094
(5.2312)
(pre-spell gamestotal games )*(ŴPCT 2 − ŴPCT IS) prior to spell . -8.5215∗∗∗
(2.875)
(pre-spell gamestotal games )*(ŴPCT IS) prior to spell . -3.758
∗∗∗
(1.4327)
EXPERIENCE prior to the start of spell -.0001818 -.00007
(.00012) (.0002)
ALL-STAR BREAK 1.803∗∗∗ 1.7974∗∗∗
(.354) (.3541)




χ2 statistic 1354.544 1362.03
Fires 339 339
Subjects 447 447
Standard errors are in the parentheses and are calculated using the method described by Lin and Wei
(1989). *,**,*** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively. The table presents
estimates of the likelihood of fire for Major League Baseball managers between 1950 and 1996. The
measures of excess winning percentage are constructed using data on all Major League Baseball players
between 1901 and 1996 and all games played between 1923 and 1996. Experience is measured as prior
to the current spell. The estimates are obtained using the proportional hazards model suggested by




j=i λ1(xj , β)]}.
46
Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics - Rehire
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
WPCT - ŴPCT 1 -0.0033 0.1119 -0.5101 0.6778 422
ŴPCT 1 − ŴPCT 2 -0.0034 0.0309 -0.1095 0.1498 422
ŴPCT 2 − ŴPCT IS 0.0032 0.0385 -0.1658 0.1535 422
ŴPCT IS 0.4902 0.0534 0.311 0.6633 422
EXPERIENCE 774.9005 841.8346 1 4377 422
AGE 49.7639 7.5092 33.8521 75.0329 422
The 422 observations are the sample of Major League Baseball managers who had a spell
begin and end between 1950 and 1996. The values of the variables are career levels up to
the employment spell end. Each of the variables is a measure of excess winning percentage.
WPCT − \WPCT 1 is the difference between the actual winning percentage and the expected
winning percentage given the actual performance of the players on the team; \WPCT 1− \WPCT 2
is the difference between the expected winning percentage given the actual performance of the
players on the team and the expected winning percentage given the ex ante expected perfor-
mance of the players on the team; \WPCT 2 − \WPCT IS is the difference between the expected
winning percentage given the ex ante expected performance of the players on the team and
the expected winning percentage given the expected performance of the players present on the
team prior to the beginning of a manager’s spell; \WPCT IS is the expected winning percentage
given the expected performance of the players present on the team prior to the beginning of a
manager’s spell.
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Table 2.8: Rehire Estimation
(1)
WPCT - ŴPCT 1 1.297
∗∗
(.6206)
ŴPCT 1 − ŴPCT 2 8.413∗∗∗
(2.0464)

















Standard errors are in the parentheses and are calculated using the method
described by Lin and Wei (1989). *,**,*** represent significance at the
90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively. The table presents estimates of
the likelihood of fire for Major League Baseball managers between 1950
and 1996. The measures of excess winning percentage are constructed
using data on all Major League Baseball players between 1901 and 1996
and all games played between 1923 and 1996. Experience is measured as
prior to the current spell. The estimates are obtained using the propor-
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The above figure represents the collection of age dummy variables estimated in the
player performance regression. The three lines represent the age effects for hit-
ters, hitting pitchers, and pitchers. The performance measure for hitters is BPC =
TB+BB+HBP+SF+SH+SB−CS
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The above figure represents the collection of year dummy variables estimated in the
player performance regression. The two lines represent the difference in year effects for
hitter productivity (BPC ) in the American and National Leagues. The year effects in-
clude the mean individual effect for each year. BPC = TB+BB+HBP+SF+SH+SB−CSAB+BB+HBP+SF+SH+SB+CS .
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The above figure represents the collection of year dummy variables estimated in
the player performance regression. The two lines represent the difference in year
effects for pitcher productivity (BPBF ) in the American and National Leagues.




Figure 2.4: Relative, End of Season
Termination Risk
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The values represented in this figure are calculated as
exp{[( tt+1 ) ∗X + ( 1t+1 )(X ± s.d.(x))] ∗ β̂1 + (t) ∗ β̂2}
exp{X ∗ β̂1}
(2.24)
where t is years of prior experience, X is mean performance level, according to one of the
performance measures, s.d.(x) is the standard deviation of the performance measure,
over a season, β̂1 is the estimated coefficient for the performance measure, and β̂2
is the estimated coefficient on prior experience. For simplicity in the calculations, I
assume that in each prior year the manager performs at the mean level for a 162 game
season and that it is neither the all-star break nor the end of the season. The solid
line represents mean performance in all years. The dashed line above the mean line
represents performance one standard deviation below the mean level while the dotted
line below the mean line represents performance one standard deviation above the mean
level. 52
Figure 2.5: Relative, End of Season
Termination Risk
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The values represented in this figure are calculated as
exp{[( tt+1 ) ∗X + ( 1t+1 )(X ± s.d.(x))] ∗ β̂1 + (t) ∗ β̂2}
exp{X ∗ β̂1}
(2.25)
where t is years of prior experience, X is mean performance level, according to one of the
performance measures, s.d.(x) is the standard deviation of the performance measure,
over a season, β̂1 is the estimated coefficient for the performance measure, and β̂2
is the estimated coefficient on prior experience. For simplicity in the calculations, I
assume that in each prior year the manager performs at the mean level for a 162 game
season and that it is neither the all-star break nor the end of the season. The solid
line represents mean performance in all years. The dashed line above the mean line
represents performance one standard deviation below the mean level while the dotted
line below the mean line.
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Figure 2.6: Relative, End of Season
Termination Risk
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The values represented in this figure are calculated as
exp{[( tt+1 ) ∗X + ( 1t+1 )(X ± s.d.(x))] ∗ β̂1 + (t) ∗ β̂2}
exp{X ∗ β̂1}
(2.26)
where t is years of prior experience, X is mean performance level, according to one of the
performance measures, s.d.(x) is the standard deviation of the performance measure,
over a season, β̂1 is the estimated coefficient for the performance measure, and β̂2
is the estimated coefficient on prior experience. For simplicity in the calculations, I
assume that in each prior year the manager performs at the mean level for a 162 game
season and that it is neither the all-star break nor the end of the season. The solid
line represents mean performance in all years. The dashed line above the mean line
represents performance one standard deviation below the mean level while the dotted
line below the mean line.
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The values represented in this figure are calculated as
exp{[( tt+1 ) ∗X + ( 1t+1 )(X ± s.d.(x))] ∗ β̂1 + (t) ∗ β̂2}
exp{X ∗ β̂1}
(2.27)
where t is years of prior experience, X is mean performance level, according to one of the
performance measures, s.d.(x) is the standard deviation of the performance measure,
over a season, β̂1 is the estimated coefficient for the performance measure, and β̂2
is the estimated coefficient on prior experience. For simplicity in the calculations, I
assume that in each prior year the manager performs at the mean level for a 162 game
season and that it is neither the all-star break nor the end of the season. The solid
line represents mean performance in all years. The dashed line above the mean line
represents performance one standard deviation below the mean level while the dotted
line below the mean line.
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Chapter 3
The Structure of Promotions by Gender:
Addressing Partial Observability
3.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades the gender wage gap has narrowed.1 The
closing of the gap is seen as a lessening of the discrimination women have
faced in the labor market. While the decreasing of the wage differential is
encouraging, wage is only one part of the labor market. It is a commonly held
belief that women face a ‘glass ceiling’ with regard to internal upward mobility.
Discrimination in the market for promotions may explain any persistence in
the wage gap since promotions are a significant source of wage growth.2
Previous empirical studies that have addressed discrimination in inter-
nal labor markets have relied on data from a specific firm or industry. Some
of the work has addressed the discrimination in promotion of lawyers, school
teachers, workers in U.S., Canadian, and Japanese firms, and white collar
federal employees.3 While these studies are an important contribution to the
literature, the results from these studies are hard to generalize because of their
narrow scope. More recent studies have attempted to produce more general-
1Blau and Kahn (2000) provides a detailed overview of the gender wage gap.
2McCue (1996) estimates that between 9 and 18% of wage growth is due to promotion.
3Spurr (1990); Eberts and Stone (1985) and Joy (1998); Paulin and Mellor (1996); Can-
nings (1988) and Cannings and Montmarquette (1991); Ariga et al (1999); Lewis (1986),
respectively. Other studies have also addressed promotion differences by gender in the
Humanities (Ginther and Hayes (1999) and in the Economics profession (McDowell et al
(1999).
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izable results by using more representative data. These studies have used the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the National Longitudinal Study of Youth
(NLSY), the Encuesta de Estructura, Conciencia y Biografia de Clase, and the
British Household Panel Survey.4 These studies yield more general results but
still fail to address a particular selection issue that is present in any estimation
of promotion probability that relies on longitudinal work histories to observe
promotions. Specifically, previous studies neither address the issue that for
an individual to receive a promotion that individual must stay on the job nor
the issue that an individual may turn down a promotion and leave the firm or
leave when not offered a promotion.
In the current study, I address the determinants of promotions using
the 1990 round of the NLSY. I estimate a bivariate probit model of promo-
tion. The primary equation is an equation for promotion and mirrors equations
presented in previous literature. The secondary equation is an equation for
‘staying on a job.’ Since only 70% of individuals make themselves available
for promotion in the sample, it is likely that selection is an issue. The stay
equation addresses the selection issue present in the observed promotions. Al-
lowing correlation in the error terms across the equations and estimating the
bivariate probit refines the estimates and yields more informative results. The
significance of the estimated correlation in the bivariate probit model suggests
the univariate estimates for promotion conditional on staying on a job are
biased. This result suggests that the unobservables in the equation for promo-
tion are correlated with the unobservables in the equation for staying on a job.
As such, the magnitude of the marginal effects vary across the univariate and
4McCue (1996), Pergamit and Veum (1999) and Gjerde (2002), Garcia-Crespo (2001),
Groot and van der Brink (1996), respectively.
57
bivariate models. Gender-separated estimation of the univariate and bivariate
models highlights the differences in the market for promotions across gender.
Specifically, the results suggest that the univariate estimates of promotion for
women are not biased while the univariate estimates of promotion for men are
biased. The bivariate probit model also allows the probability of an observed
promotion (i.e. the joint probability of staying and receiving a promotion of-
fer) to be decomposed in the probability of promotion conditional on staying
on a job and the probability of staying on a job. These estimates suggest that
women are less likely to receive a promotion a priori than men all else equal.
The estimates also suggest that women are more likely to remain on a job than
men all else equal. Furthermore, there is evidence that women stay on jobs in
order to signal attachment to the labor market.
3.2 Data
This study of promotions uses data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY). This data set contains work histories for a represen-
tative sample of United States citizens born between 1957 and 1964 starting
in 1979. The survey itself covers a broad range of topics but with a focus on
labor market issues. The survey contains information for each respondent on
education, training, earnings, hours worked, and other job characteristics. The
information regarding promotions and job changes are of particular interest
for the present study.
In defining the sample, I eliminated respondents that did not exhibit
a reasonable attachment to the labor market. I eliminated respondents that
worked for less than 15 weeks or less than 20 hours per week in both 1989 and
1990. This restriction eliminates workers that are seasonal. I also eliminated
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respondents that are either self-employed, working in a farming occupation
or industry, or in the armed forces in either 1989 or 1990. This restriction
removes those individuals that face considerably different job and promotion
structures than the typical worker.5
Of particular interest is the identification of promotions in the sample.
To establish a promotion, I begin by identifying all main jobs held in 1989.
These jobs are the sample of jobs that are ‘at risk’ for a promotion between the
interview date in 1989 and the interview date in 1990. A necessary condition
for an observed promotion is that the respondent must remain on the job
between 1989 and 1990. Therefore, I identify the respondent as a ‘job-stayer’
if he or she reports that the main job in 1989 is also the main job in 1990. From
the sample of ‘job-stayers’, I identify valid promotions. In 1990, the respondent
was asked if he or she had received any promotions from the employer on the
main job since the previous interview. I classified these reported promotions
as a valid promotion if the respondent reported the promotion for the current
job and the respondent is in the sample of ’job-stayers.’ It is important to note
that this formulation understates the total number of promotions because it
is possible that the respondent was promoted at a job that was not the main
job in 1989 but is the main job in 1990 as a result of the promotion.6
3.3 Univariate Probit
3.3.1 Model Specification
In order to correctly estimate promotion probabilities, it is useful to
begin with models previously estimated. The model is a univariate probit of
5These restrictions follow those used in McCue (1996).
6There are 275 cases where the respondent reports a promotion but is not classified as
such in the data.
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the following form:
yi = Xβ + εi (3.1)
where y = 1 if the individual was promoted at the current job and y = 0 if
the individual was not promoted. X is a set of covariates, β is a vector of
parameters to be estimated, and ε is an error term that is assumed to have
a standard normal distribution. The set of covariates includes characteristics
about the individual and her job.7
An important consideration in the estimation of equation 3.1 is the
sample used. The decision lies in the classification of individuals who do not
remain on the same job from year t to year t + 1. These individuals can be
classified as either ‘not promoted’ or they can be removed from the sample.
The former case treats leaving and staying but not getting promoted as the
same outcome when factors that make one of these outcomes more likely may
affect the other outcome oppositely. The latter case solves the problem of
confounding the determinants of two distinct outcomes but the estimation
yields only a conditional probability. That is, the promotion probabilities are
conditional on individuals having stayed on a job and will be biased if the
unobservables affecting the receipt of a promotion offer are correlated with
the unobservables affecting the stay decision.
7It is important to note that this empirical model of promotion incidence differs from
some previous studies. For example, Hersch (1995), Hersch and Viscusi (1996), and Garcia
(2001) each consider the number of promotions an individual receives at an employer as the
dependent variable while Gjerde (2002) uses an indicator for having received at least one
promotion at an employer as the dependent variable. The current formulation does follow
the specification of Pergamit and Veum (1999).
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3.3.2 Results
The summary statistics for the full sample and men and women only
sub-samples are presented in table 3.1. In the full sample, 23% of respondents
stayed on the main job and reported a promotion while 24.42% of male respon-
dents and 21.29% of female respondents stayed on the main job and reported
a promotion. In general, there is little difference between men and women.
Men have roughly 15 more weeks of actual experience and 4 more months of
positional tenure while there is little difference in experience across gender.
On average, women have one half a grade more education and score higher
on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) but men earn $1.70 more per
hour than women and work more roughly 4 more hours a week. The training
requirement for the average job is quite similar. 60.7% of men are in jobs that
require special training or experience while 61.5% of women are in jobs that
require special training or experience. However, 44% of men supervise other
workers at their job while only 36% of women supervise other workers at their
job. Finally, there appears to be little difference in the racial makeups of the
two samples. The men only sample is 38.5% non-white while the female only
sample is 41.3% non-white.
3.3.2.1 Probability of Promotion
The results of the single equation conditional job-stayer probit estima-




= Φ[(xi + s.d.(xi))β̂i + X
j
β̂j]− Φ(Xβ̂) (3.2)
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function, X
j
is the vector of
61
means for the explanatory variables excluding variable i, β̂j is the vector of
estimated coefficients, xi is the mean of the variable of interest, s.d.(xi) is its
standard deviation, and β̂i is the estimated coefficient.
The results of the estimation suggest that experience, employer tenure,
positional tenure, hourly wage, educational level, and whether or not an in-
dividual supervises others are significant determinants of promotion. It also
appears that gender plays a role in promotion. The marginal effects associated
with each of these coefficients have absolute magnitudes that range from 1.47
to 6.49 percentage points. The coefficient on the highest grade completed is
significant and positive. The coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation
increase above the mean raises the likelihood of promotion by 2.19 percentage
points all else equal. This change represents an 10.4% increase. The impli-
cation is that acquiring more education makes a worker more productive and
more likely to receive a promotion. In the case of experience, employer tenure,
and positional tenure, I included a squared term to allow for non-linearity in
the effect. The coefficients on the experience variables are jointly significant.
The coefficient on the linear term is positive and significant while the coeffi-
cient on the quadratic term is negative and significant. The coefficients are
also jointly significant at the one percent level.8 Given the coefficients, the
likelihood of promotion increases up until 300 weeks (5.77 years) of experience
and then declines. This result implies that the probability of promotion is
increasing in the first 5 years and decreasing thereafter. The coefficients on
the employer tenure variables are also jointly significant.9 However, the signs
on the coefficients do not follow the same pattern. The coefficient on the linear
8The χ2 statistic is 13.73 and the associated p-value is .001.
9The χ2 statistic is 12.52 and the associated p-value is .0019.
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term is negative while the sign on the quadratic is positive. The likelihood of
promotion decreases from the start of time with an employer until 350 weeks
(6.73 years) of tenure and then the likelihood of promotion begins to increase.
The coefficients on the positional tenure variables exhibit the same sign pat-
tern as employer tenure and are jointly significant.10 Initially increasing posi-
tional tenure reduces the likelihood of promotion but after 137.5 months (11.49
years) the likelihood of promotion increases with positional tenure. The fact
that increasing both employer tenure and positional tenure initially decreases
the likelihood of promotion may reflect workers learning about jobs over time.
It is also possible that this result reflects a selection of individuals into long
employer or positional tenure.
A variable of interest in the estimation is the dummy variable for fe-
males. The coefficient is significant at the 95% level and carries a marginal
effect of -.0338. This effect suggests that females are less likely to receive a
promotion than their male counterparts all else equal.11 The unconditional
probability of promotion in the sample is 23%. However, there is a difference
in this unconditional probability across gender of stayers. For men, the un-
conditional probability is 24.42% while for women, it is only 21.29%. This fact
coupled with the significance and magnitude of the coefficient on the female
dummy variable suggests that internal labor markets differ across gender. In
an effort to capture these differences, I estimated the model of promotions
separately for men and women. The results of these estimations are presented
in the third and fifth columns of table 3.2. The results from the estimations
strengthen the notion that internal labor markets differ across genders.
10The χ2 statistic is 12.63 and the associated p-value is .0018.
11This estimate is not unlike the marginal effects reported by Gjerde(2002, -.053) and
Pergamit and Veum (1999, -.042).
63
The models differ significantly with regard to the experience, employer
tenure, and positional tenure variables. For men, the coefficients on the ex-
perience variables are jointly significant while they are not jointly significant
for women.12 In both models, the coefficient on the linear term is positive
while the coefficient on the quadratic term is negative. This result follows the
interpretation of the full sample model that promotions do not occur at the
start of the career but do happen relatively early in careers. How early differs
considerably by gender. For men, the likelihood of promotion increases until
287.5 weeks (5.53 years) of experience while for women, the likelihood of pro-
motion increases until 650 weeks (12.5 years). The significantly longer period
of increasing likelihood of promotion for women and the considerably smaller
effect at the mean (-.26 vs. -4.69 percentage points) of experience suggests
that experience has a smaller effect on the likelihood of promotion for women
than men.13 A possible explanation for this result is that women may be
in jobs where they acquire less human capital. Another possible explanation
is that are less able to reveal their ability. The results with regard to posi-
tional tenure also support these explanations. The magnitude of the effect of
positional tenure on the likelihood of promotion of women is larger (-1.69 per-
centage points) but it also appears that positional tenure affects the likelihood
of promotion of women less than for men. The coefficients on the positional
tenure variables are jointly significant for the men only sample but not for the
women only sample.14 The employer tenure variables are jointly significant
12For men, the χ2 statistic is 14.85 and the associated p-value is .0006. For women, the
χ2 statistic is 1.87 and the associated p-value is .3923.
13The experience-promotion likelihood profile for women is much flatter than the the
profile for men.
14For men, the χ2 statistic is 10.35 and the associated p-value is .0056. For women, the
χ2 statistic is 2.43 and the associated p-value is .2972.
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in both the men only and women only samples.15 The marginal effect at the
mean of employer tenure is larger for women than men (-.0274 vs -.0223). It
is possible that employer tenure is a signal of labor force attachment. If this is
the case, it suggests that attachment to the labor force is observed noisily from
outside the employer. It is also possible that the number of hours worked per
week is a signal of labor force attachment. In the full sample, the coefficient
on hours worked per week is positive but is not significant. In the women only
sample, the coefficient is positive and significant. In the men only sample,
the coefficient is negative but insignificant. A reasonable explanation for this
difference is that women who work more hours are signaling to employers that
they are committed to the labor market and will not drop out of the work
force.
The results from the estimations presented in table 3.2 suggest that
women are less likely to be promoted than men. It appears that white women
are 16.1% less likely to be promoted than their male counterparts.16 The
implication is that the market for promotions is considerably different for men
and women. Furthermore, the decision to stay on a job is likely an important
consideration in estimating the likelihood of promotion. As such, it is useful to
estimate a bivariate probit model that considers both promotion and staying
on a job.
15For men, the χ2 statistic is 5.63 and the associated p-value is .06. For women, the χ2
statistic is 7.58 and the associated p-value is .0226.
16The percentage is calculated as the marginal effect divided by the predicted probability




As presented in this paper, promotions are the product of two deci-
sions. The first decision involves individuals staying on or leaving a job while
the second decision involves individuals either receiving or not receiving a pro-
motion offer. It is possible that the unobserved determinants of receiving a
promotion offer are correlated with the unobserved determinants of staying
on a job. As such, it is necessary to develop a model that addresses this is-
sue. The present model follows the form of the bivariate probit with partial
observability presented in Poirier (1980).17
Let yi1 = 1 if an individual remains on a job and yi1 = 0 otherwise.
Let yi2 = 1 if an individual receives a promotion offer and yi2 = 0 otherwise.
In the present data, I observe y∗ = yi1 ∗ yi2 and yi1. This information is useful
in the estimation. As such, the present model follows more closely the model
presented as case three in Meng and Schmidt (1982). The model is as follows:
y∗i1 = Xi1β1 + εi1 (3.3)
y∗i2 = Xi2β2 + εi2
where for j = 1,2
yij = 1 if y
∗
ij > 0 (3.4)
yij = 0 if y
∗
ij ≤ 0.
17The bivariate probit model has been used to study the Union status of workers (Abowd
and Farber (1982) and Farber (1983)), the migration decisions of workers (Eliasson et al
(2003)), and the employment status of teens (Mohanty (2002)). Gjerde (2002) uses the
bivariate probit to model promotions but the authors ‘secondary’ equation is job choice
rather than the decision to stay on a job as in the present paper.
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The possible observed outcomes are
(yi1 = 1, yi2 = 1) (3.5)
(yi1 = 1, yi2 = 0)
(yi1 = 0, yi2 = •).
The log-likelihood function is then:
lnL(β1, β2, ρ) =
N∑
i=1
{yi1yi2lnΦ2(Xi1β1, Xi2β2, ρ) (3.6)
+ yi1(1− yi2)ln[Φ(Xi1β1)− Φ2(Xi1β1, Xi2β2, ρ)]
+ (1− yi1)lnΦ(−Xi1β1)}.
Φ(·) represents the standard normal distribution and Φ2(·, ρ) represents the
bivariate normal distribution function. In the case of the bivariate normal
distribution, ρ is the correlation between the corresponding unobservables from
the ‘remain on a job’ and promotion offer equations defined in equation 3.3
(εi1 and εi2, respectively). Xi1 and Xi2 are the explanatory variables for the
corresponding equation. β1, β2, and ρ are parameters to be estimated. It is
important to note that identification of the parameters is dependent upon at
least one variable appearing in either Xi1 or Xi2 but not in the other.
3.4.2 Results
The summary statistics for the full, women, and men only samples are
presented in table 3.3. These samples differ from those presented in table
3.1. In the current samples, all respondents are used whether or not they
stayed on a job. As such, the observed promotion rates are lower in these
samples. In the full sample, 16.11% of respondents stayed on the main job
and reported a promotion while 17.11% of male respondents and 14.92% of
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female respondents stayed on the main job and reported a promotion. In
general, there is still little difference in human capital characteristics across
gender. Men have more weeks of experience and positional tenure but the
mean level of employer tenure is the same across gender. Men also earn $1.50
more than women, work roughly 4 more hours a week, and are more likely to
be a supervisor (42.6 vs. 35.7). Women are slightly more likely to experience
a change in marital status, are slightly more likely to be in a job that requires
special training or experience, and have more education and higher AFQT test
scores.
The results of the bivariate probit estimation are presented in table
3.4. In this estimation, it is possible to use the sample of job stayers and non-
stayers as described in section 3.2. Identification of the parameters requires
the explanatory variables in the stay equation to differ from the explanatory
variables in the promotion offer equation. In the present model, a dummy
variable for change in marital status and a dummy variable for whether the
individual is living in her ‘home’ Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) serve
in this capacity. It is reasonable to argue that neither variable affects the
likelihood of receiving a promotion offer while both affect the likelihood of
remaining on a job. It is likely that either getting married or divorced affects
whether an individual remains on a job held prior to the change in marital
status. It is not clear that this variable affects the likelihood of promotion.
The dummy variable for living in home MSA takes the value 1 if the individual
is living in the same MSA in 1989 as she was in 1979.18 The presumption is
that an individual may be more or less likely to remain on a job if they are
near home but it is not clear why this variable should affect whether or not
18This information is available in the NLSY geocode data.
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the individual receives a promotion offer. The advantage of the bivariate
probit is that it allows a correlation between the error terms between the
‘promotion’ and ‘stay’ equations and corrects any bias due to this correlation.
The null hypothesis of no correlation can be rejected at the 5% level. This
result suggests that there is a correlation in the error terms. Specifically, the
unobservables associated with staying on a job positively affect whether an
individual is promoted. Given the significance of the estimated correlation,
the bivariate probit is an improvement over the univariate probit.
3.4.2.1 Probability of Promotion
The results from the bivariate probit are presented in table 3.4. The
marginal effects constructed from the univariate probit presented in table 3.2
are based on the sample of job-stayers only. It is possible to use the results
from the ‘stay’ equation (yi1) and the promotion equation (yi2) to construct
these same marginal effects using the full sample of both stayers and non-
stayers. Given the significant estimated correlation between the unobserved
determinants of staying and those of receiving a promotion offer, it is possible
that these marginal effects will differ significantly from those reported in table
3.2. The conditional probabilities are calculated in the following way:






where Φ(·) and Φ2(·, ρ) represent the standard normal and bivariate normal
distribution functions, respectively, Xi1 and Xi2 are the explanatory variables
for the corresponding equation, and β1, β2, and ρ are estimated parameters.
The conditional probabilities are then used to construct the marginal effects,
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which are presented in the column labelled ∆Pr[yi2 = 1|yi1 = 1] of tables 3.4,
3.5, and 3.6. The marginal effects for xi are calculated as:
∆Pr[yi2 = 1|yi1 = 1]
∆xi
=
Φ2[(xi + s.d.(xi))β̂i1 + X
j
1β̂j1, (x
i + s.d.(xi))β̂i2 + X
j
2β̂j2, ρ]




− Φ2[Xβ1, Xβ2, ρ]
Φ[Xβ1]
where Φ(·) and Φ2(·, ρ) represent the standard normal and bivariate normal
distribution functions, respectively, Xj is the vector of means for the explana-
tory variables excluding variable i, β̂j is the vector of estimated coefficients, x
i
is the mean of the variable of interest, s.d.(xi) is its standard deviation, and β̂i
is the estimated coefficient.
The results of the bivariate probit are not unlike the results for the
univariate probit presented in table 3.2. While the significance of the estimated
correlation suggests that the bivariate probit is the correct model, the cost
to estimating a simple univariate probit appears to be low. In general, the
magnitudes of marginal effects and standard errors differ only slightly. The
differences across the univariate and bivariate models represent a ‘refinement’
of the estimates of the likelihood of promotion. This result is expected since
the bivariate probit is a more efficient and unbiased model given the structure
suggested by equations 3.3-3.5. There is one considerable change across the
models. In the univariate probit the coefficients on the experience, employer
tenure, and positional tenure variables are all significant. In the bivariate
probit, only the coefficients on the experience variables are significant in the
promotion equation. The coefficients on the employer tenure variables are not
jointly significant while the coefficients on the positional tenure variables are
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jointly significant.19 However, the null hypothesis that the set of employer and
positional tenure coefficients are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected.20 The
implication is that employer and positional tenure do not determine whether
an individual is promoted.
The results from the univariate and bivariate probits suggest that women
and men differ in their likelihood of receiving a promotion. Given this finding,
it is important to consider separate estimation of the bivariate probit for men
and women. Estimating the model separately for men and women allows the
correlation between the error terms in the stay and promotion equations to
differ by gender. The results from the separate women and men estimations
are presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6, respectively.
There is an important difference in the separate bivariate models. In
the full sample bivariate probit, the estimate of ρ is significantly different
from 0. This result suggests that the unobserved determinants of receiving a
promotion offer are correlated with the unobserved determinants of staying on
a job. In the men only bivariate probit, this result is repeated. The estimated
correlation is positive and indicates that the unobservables associated with
staying on a job affect the likelihood promotion. It is likely that men consider
internal mobility in the decision to stay on a job. If a man is likely to receive
a promotion he will stay while if he is not likely to receive a promotion he
will leave.21 In the women only bivariate probit, the estimated correlation is
not significantly different from zero. The implication is that the unobserved
19For the employer tenure coefficients, the χ2 statistic is .68 and the associated p-value
is .7112. For the positional tenure coefficients, the χ2 statistic is 5.02 and the associated
p-value is .0811.
20The χ2 statistic is 5.71 and the associated p-value is .22147.
21This notion is tested in Velamuri and Prisinzano (2004).
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determinants of receiving a promotion are not correlated with the unobserved
determinants of staying on a job for women. As such, separately estimated
univariate equations for women are consistent.
The return to education appears to differ considerably across gender.
For men, increasing the highest grade completed by one standard deviation
above the mean increases the likelihood of promotion by 11.3% all else equal
while the same increase only increases the likelihood of promotion by 5.5%
for women. The fact that it appears men have a higher return to education
suggest that there is a glass ceiling that women face in the market for pro-
motions. An explanation for the difference in the return to education is that
employers discount women’s extra education because they are more likely to
leave the labor market. As such, employers may be hesitant to reward women
with promotions. The univariate probit results suggest a similar difference
across gender. In the univariate case, for men, education level (highest grade
completed) is a significant determinant of promotion while for women, the co-
efficient on the highest grade completed is insignificant and the marginal effect
associated with the coefficient is relatively small. The difference in the models
suggest that the return to education is higher for men in terms of increased
promotion likelihood.
The effects of experience, employer tenure, and positional tenure differ
considerably across genders. In the men only model, the coefficients on the
experience variables are jointly significant.22 The likelihood of promotion in-
creases with the first 250 weeks of experience and then decreases. The effect at
the mean of the covariates is negative and reduces the likelihood of promotion
by 15.6%. For women, the experience variables are not jointly significant and
22The χ2 statistic is 8.15 and the associated p-value is .017.
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the ‘peak’ of the effect is at a larger value for women (284 weeks) than men.23
This result suggests that experience does not affect the likelihood of promo-
tion as much for women as it does for men. The effect at the mean of the
covariates for women is negative and it is considerably smaller than the effect
for men (-18.9% vs -3.1%). The implication is that women’s promotions are
delayed relative to men. A possible explanation for the delay is the fact that
women need to signal attachment to the labor force in order to receive a pro-
motion. For the period of time that they are signaling attachment, women are
‘underemployed.’ That is, women are in jobs that do not reflect their ability.
The coefficients on the employer tenure variables are not significant in either
model.24 For men, the likelihood of promotion only increases with the first
10.5 weeks of employer tenure while for women, the likelihood of promotion
increases with the first 367 weeks of employer tenure. This implies that women
benefit more than men from being with an employer. The effect at the mean
in both models is negative. For men, increasing employer tenure reduces the
likelihood by 6.5% while for women, increasing employer tenure decreases the
likelihood of promotion by 21%. As such, the likelihood of promotion declines
faster with employer tenure for women than men. The exact opposite result is
found in the coefficients on positional tenure. The ‘minimum’ of the effect is
later for men than women (158 vs. 104 months) but the overall negative effect
is larger for men than women (-15.78% vs. -11.4%). Given the seemingly con-
tradictory results evident in the employer and positional tenure variables, it is
not clear that women face a glass ceiling. It is possible that the ‘extra’ bene-
fit women receive from employer tenure reflects the fact that employers delay
23The χ2 statistic is 1.82 and the associated p-value is .4025.
24The χ2 statistic is 1.49 and the associated p-value is .4756 for women. The χ2 statistic
is .9 and the associated p-value is .6366 for men.
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the promotion of women. It is only when employers can observe a woman’s
attachment to the firm that she is promoted. Furthermore, it is possible that
the extra cost women face with regard to positional tenure is due to the fact
that they are promoted in large steps to offset the underemployment.
In the univariate probit estimates, the marginal effect associated with
the coefficient on the hourly wage differs considerably across gender. For
men, increasing the hourly wage by one standard deviation above the mean
decreases the likelihood of promotion by 11.5%. For women, the same increase
has no effect on the likelihood of promotion.25 In the men only bivariate
probit, the same increase reduces the likelihood of promotion by 10.35% while
for women, the same increase increases the likelihood of promotion by .37%.
Since promotions may be associated with wage increases, it is reasonable that
higher wages reduce the likelihood of promotion. The fact that the direction
for women is positive suggests that women may receive a wage that does not
reflect their productivity. As such, a higher wage does not preclude women
from receiving a promotion. It is important to note that the coefficient on the
hourly wage is significant in the men only univariate probit estimation but not
the bivariate probit estimation. This discrepancy is an artifact of the bias and
inconsistency associated with a univariate probit in the presence of correlation
between the unobservables in the stay and promotion equations.
3.4.2.2 Probability of Staying on a Job
The bivariate probit estimation not only provides estimates for the
likelihood of receiving a promotion but also estimates for the likelihood of
staying on a job. In the model specification, the equation for staying on a job
25The percentage change in the likelihood is .07.
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is represented by yi1 in equation 3.6. The probability of staying on a job is
computed in the following way:
Pr(yi1 = 1) = Pr(yi2 = 1, yi1 = 1) + Pr(yi2 = 0, yi1 = 1) (3.9)
= Φ2[Xi1β1, Xi2β2, ρ] + Φ[Xi1β1]− Φ2[Xi1β1, Xi2β2, ρ]
= Φ[Xi1β1]
where Φ(·) and Φ2(·, ρ) represent the standard normal and bivariate normal
distribution functions, respectively, Xi1 and Xi2 are the explanatory variables
for the corresponding equation, and β1, β2, and ρ are estimated parameters.
The probabilities are then used to construct the marginal effects, which are
presented in the column labelled ∆Pr[yi1 = 1] of tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. The
marginal effects are constructed as in equation 3.2.
It is reasonable to expect that individuals with high levels of experience,
employer tenure, and positional tenure are more likely to remain on a job. In
the case of experience, the expectation is that individuals with high levels of
experience are older and less willing to move to new jobs. It is also likely
that ‘job-shopping’ occurs early in careers. In the case of employer tenure, the
presumption is that individuals with high employer tenure have acquired sig-
nificant amounts of employer-specific capital. Similarly, individuals with high
levels of positional tenure have gained significant amounts of job-specific cap-
ital. Given these presumptions, the effects of these variables on the likelihood
of staying on a job should be positive. In each of the models, the effects are
positive. The full, women, and men only samples provide similar estimates of
the effect of experience. The models suggest that increasing experience by one
standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood between 3 and 5%.
The coefficients on the experience variables are also jointly significant in each
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of the models.26 The models do differ in the estimate of the effects of employer
and positional tenure. In each of the models, the coefficients on the employer
tenure variables are jointly significant.27 However, increasing employer tenure
by one standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood of staying
on a job by 17% for women but only 13% for men. The implication of this
difference is that women are more attached to employers. It is likely that
women remain with employers to reveal their attachment to the labor market
and advance in their careers. This notion is also supported by the results
presented in section 3.4.2.1. The estimates of the effect of positional tenure
also differ across gender. The coefficients on the positional tenure variables are
significant in the full and men only samples but not the women only samples.28
The magnitude of the effect for men is larger than it is for women (7 vs. 2%).
This difference is reasonable if women make large jumps internally rather than
a series of small steps.29
The coefficient on the number of hours worked per week varies across
the three models. In both the full and women only samples, the marginal
effect is positive and the coefficient is significant. It suggests that working
more hours per week increases the likelihood of remaining on a job. In the men
only sample, the marginal effect is positive but the coefficient is insignificant.
Furthermore, the effect of increasing the number of hours worked per week
one standard deviation above the mean is much larger for women than men
(3.9 vs .4%). An explanation for this difference is that women who work
26The χ2 statistics are 13.73, 9.88, and 5.02 with associated p-values of .001, .0071, and
.0815 for the full, women only, and men only samples, respectively.
27The χ2 statistics are 184.17, 113.87, and 75.44 with associated p-values of .000, .000,
and .000 for the full, women only, and men only samples, respectively.
28The χ2 statistics are 23.93, 1.7, and 26.39 with associated p-values of .000, .428, and
.000 for the full, women only, and men only samples, respectively.
29It is not possible to test this with the current data.
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more hours are less likely to leave a job for reasons such as childbirth. The
effect of education on the likelihood of staying on a job also varies across
gender. The coefficient on the highest grade completed is not significantly
different from zero in the full or women only sample estimations. In the men
only estimation, the coefficient is significant. It is also the case that for men,
increasing education level by one standard deviation above the mean level
increases the likelihood of staying on a job by 2.2% all else equal. For women,
the same increase decreases the likelihood of staying on a job by 1%. A possible
explanation for this difference is that women may begin careers at less than
ideal jobs because they need to establish their attachment to the labor market.
As such, more educated women may be more likely to job shop. The effect
of whether an individual supervises others supports this notion. In each of
the models, the effect of being a supervisor is negative. The implication is
that individuals who are supervisors and likely more productive are less likely
to stay on a job. For women, this effect is twice as large as it is for men (9
vs 4.2%). The implication is that women who are more productive and are
recognized as such by an employer are more likely to job shop.
It is not obvious what effects changes in marital status or gender will
have on an individual’s likelihood of remaining on a job, a priori. The re-
sults from all three models suggest that individuals whose marital status has
changed are less likely to remain on a job all else equal. However, the co-
efficient is significant and negative in the full and women only samples but
insignificant and negative in the men only sample. Furthermore, the marginal
effects suggest that a change in marital status decreases the likelihood of stay-
ing on a job by 6.5, 8.2, and 4.4% for the full, women only, and men only
samples, respectively. Given the women only effect doubles the men only ef-
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fect, it is a reasonable interpretation that women are tied movers more often
than men. The results from the full sample suggest that there is a difference
across gender in the likelihood of staying on a job. It appears that women are
3% more likely than men to remain on a job. This result is interesting since
the sample rate of staying on a job by gender is almost identical. Of 2561
women in the sample, 70.06% stayed on their job from 1989 to 1990 while of
the 3039 men in the sample, 70.05% stayed on their job from 1989 to 1990.
This result supports the notion that women must signal their attachment to
the labor force. It is possible that labor force attachment is observed noisily
outside of the firm. As such, women may need to remain with an employer in
order to experience career growth in terms of wage and promotion.
3.4.2.3 Probability of Stay and Promotion
An advantage of the bivariate probit estimation is that it allows a con-
struction of the probability of staying on a job and receiving a promotion offer.
This joint probability depends on the probability of staying and the probabil-
ity of receiving a promotion offer conditional on staying. This probability is
constructed in the following way:
Pr(yi2 = 1, yi1 = 1) = Φ2(Xi1β1, Xi2β2, ρ) (3.10)
where Φ2(·, ρ) represents the bivariate normal distribution function, Xi1 and
Xi2 are the explanatory variables for the corresponding equations, and β1, β2,
and ρ are estimated parameters. These probabilities are then used to construct
marginal effects, which are presented in the column labelled ∆Pr[yi2 = 1, yi1 =
1] of tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. The marginal effects for xi are calculated as:
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∆Pr[yi2 = 1, yi1 = 1] =Φ2[(xi + s.d.(xi))β̂i1 + X
j
1β̂j1, (x
i + s.d.(xi))β̂i2 + X
j
2β̂j2, ρ] (3.11)
− Φ2[Xβ1, Xβ2, ρ]
where Φ2(·, ρ) represents the bivariate normal distribution function, Xj is the
vector of means for the explanatory variables excluding variable i, β̂j is the
vector of estimated coefficients, xi is the mean of the variable of interest, s.d.(xi)
is its standard deviation, and β̂i is the estimated coefficient.
The predicted probability at X differs considerably across the estimated
models. In the full sample, Pr[yi2 = 1, yi1 = 1] is .1662. The same probability
is .1816 in the men only sample and only .1244 in the women only sample.
These estimates are different than the unconditional sample probabilities. In
the case of men, the estimate is larger than the sample probability (.1711)
while in the case of women, the estimate is lower than the sample probability
(.1492). The marginal effect of the coefficient on the female dummy variable, in
the full sample estimation, suggests that a priori the likelihood of promotion is
12.4% lower for women than men all else equal. This effect can be decomposed
into women’s 3.14% higher likelihood of staying on a job and their 15.1% lower
likelihood of promotion given having stayed on the job.
There is evidence of a signaling model of promotion for women in the
estimates of Pr[yi2 = 1, yi1 = 1]. The coefficients on the all four experience
variables are significant in each model.30 The direction of the effects differs
by gender. For men, the effect is negative while it is positive for women.
This difference suggests that a priori women with more experience are more
30The χ2 statistics are 50.16, 11.57, and 16.03 with associated p-values of .000, .0208, and
.003 for the full, women only, and men only samples, respectively.
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likely to stay on a job and get promoted. It is likely that women with more
experience have successfully signalled their attachment to the labor force all
else equal. This notion is also supported by the effect of hours worked per week
on Pr[yi2 = 1, yi1 = 1]. In the full model, the marginal effect of increasing the
number of hours worked per week by one standard deviation above the mean
increases the likelihood of staying on a job and being promoted by 5.6%.31
This effect increases to 17% in the women only sample and decreases to .11%
in the men only sample.32 The implication is that women who work a larger
number of hours are more attached to the labor market and therefore, more
likely to stay at a job and receive a promotion.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined the structure of promotion. Specifically, I
modelled a promotion as the result of two decisions: the decision to stay on a
job and the promotion offer decision. The latter decision has been addressed
previously in the literature. The former decision is one that has been over-
looked. By estimating a bivariate probit, I accounted for potential bias that
may result from correlation between the unobservables in the equation for pro-
motion and the unobservables in the equation for staying on a job. I found
that there is a significant correlation. The presence of the correlation suggests
that univariate estimates of promotion are potentially biased. In the present
case, it appears that the cost to ignoring the correlation is low since the differ-
31The null hypothesis that the coefficients on the number of hours worked per week are
jointly equal to zero can be rejected. The χ2 statistic is 7.57 and the associated p-value is
.0227.
32The null hypothesis that the coefficients on the number of hours worked per week are
jointly equal to zero can be rejected in the women only sample. The χ2 statistic is 17.54
and the associated p-value is .0001. The null cannot be rejected in the men only sample
(χ2=.26, p-value=.878).
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ences across the models is small. However, there are significant differences in
the structure of promotions across gender. First, both univariate and bivari-
ate estimates suggest that women are less likely to be promoted all else equal.
The estimated gap is roughly 15%. This effect is large and implies that the
market for promotions differs by gender. Estimating gender-separated models
supports this notion. A considerable difference is the fact that for men, there
is a significant positive correlation between the unobservables in the equation
for promotion and the unobservables in the equation for staying on a job while
for women, there appears to be no correlation. This implies that men who
are more likely to stay are more likely to be promoted. The same is not true
for women. In fact, the absence of a significant correlation suggests that for
women, the two decisions are independent. A possible explanation for this dif-
ference is that men and women have different career expectations. Men may
only remain on jobs when they are likely to receive a promotion while women
remain for other reasons. The other reasons may include signaling attachment
to the labor market. The results from the estimated probabilities of being
promoted given having stayed on a job, of staying on a job, and of staying on
a job and being promoted support this notion. The estimates suggest that a
priori women with more experience are more likely to stay on a job and be
promoted while a priori men with more experience are less likely to stay on a
job and be promoted. It is possible that employers do not promote women as
often because of the perceived risk of women leaving the firm. By increasing
experience, women signal their attachment. This is supported by the results
of the estimated probability of promotion given having stayed on a job. In
these results, it appears that women benefit from experience and employer
tenure more than men. Since each variable is a reasonable measure of labor
force attachment, the results support the signaling explanation for promotion
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differences. The results also suggest that women are more likely than men to
stay on a job all else equal and it appears that women who work more hours
per week are more likely to stay on a job. This result suggests that women who
are more attached to the labor market (as signalled through hours worked per
week) remain on jobs to possibly signal attachment and present themselves as
a viable promotion candidate.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics - Univariate Probit
Total Men Women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Promotions .2299 .4208 .2442 .4297 .2129 .4095
Experience 244.7092 152.2203 252.2602 151.8579 235.748 152.2061
Employer Tenure 161.2414 142.1795 161.5744 144.0446 160.8462 139.9729
Positional Tenure 38.7721 36.4793 40.7764 37.9605 36.3935 34.4992
Training Required .6072 .4884 .6054 .4889 .6093 .4881
Hours worked per Week 42.5328 8.2741 44.3316 8.732 40.398 7.1312
Highest Grade Completed 13.2011 2.2883 12.969 2.3663 13.4766 2.1605
Hourly Wage 9.6765 4.7501 10.4508 4.982 8.7575 4.2827
Supervise Work of Others .4048 .4909 .4425 .4968 .3601 .4802
AFQT 44.8468 28.6478 44.3495 29.9099 45.437 27.0702
Non-White .3982 .4896 .3852 .4867 .4136 .4926
Observations 3923 2129 1794
The sample includes all respondents who remained on a job between 1989 and 1990. Experience and
Employer Tenure are measured in weeks. Positional Tenure is measured in months. Experience is
measured prior to current employer. Employer tenure is measured prior to current position.
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Table 3.2: Probit Estimation
Promotion










Experience .0018∗∗∗ -.0281 .0013 -.0026 .0023∗∗ -.0469
(.0007) (.001) (.001)
(Experience)2 -3.00e-06∗∗∗ -1.00e-06 -4.00e-06∗∗∗
(1.00e-06) (2.00e-06) (2.00e-06)
Employer Tenure -.0021∗∗∗ -.0273 -.0025∗∗ -.0274 -.0019∗∗ -.0223
(.0007) (.001) (.0009)
(Employer Tenure)2 3.00e-06∗∗∗ 4.00e-06∗ 3.00e-06∗∗
(1.00e-06) (2.00e-06) (2.00e-06)
Positional Tenure -.0055∗∗∗ -.0305 -.0044 -.0169 -.0066∗∗ -.0372
(.0021) (.0034) (.0027)
(Positional Tenure)2 .00002 .00002 .00003
(1.00e-05) (.00002) (.00002)
Special Training Required .0197 .0057 .0807 .0197 -.0167 -.005
(.0478) (.0722) (.0643)
Hours worked per Week .0024 .0058 .0101∗∗ .0176 -.0009 -.0027
(.0029) (.0049) (.0036)
Highest Grade Completed .0322∗∗ .0219 .0164 .0085 .0355∗∗ .026
(.0131) (.0204) (.0174)
Hourly Wage -.0108∗ -.0147 .0001 .0001 -.0177∗∗ -.0258
(.0058) (.0094) (.0073)
Supervise Work of Others .2083∗∗∗ .0649 .2315∗∗∗ .0608 .1903∗∗∗ .0612
(.0477) (.0717) (.0643)
AFQT .0005 .0043 -.0004 -.0032 .0012 .0109
(.0011) (.0018) (.0015)
Female -.1235∗∗ -.0338 . .
(.0484)
Non-White -.0119 -.0034 .059 .0143 -.0716 -.021
(.0525) (.0797) (.0704)
Constant -1.006∗∗∗ -1.3687∗∗∗ -.8145∗∗∗
(.2158) (.3228) (.2897)
Predicted Probability at X
a
.2101 .1517 .2266
Observations 3923 1794 2129
Log-Likelihood -2049.753 -897.3952 -1144.2
χ2 statistic 130.9549 63.1314 78.7295
Standard errors are in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%
levels, respectively. The marginal effect for xi is calculated as
∆Pr(y=1)
∆xi
= Φ[(xi + s.d.(xi))
bβi +
X
jcβj ]− Φ(X bβ) where Φ is the standard normal distribution function, Xj is the vector of means
for the explanatory variables excluding variable i, cβj is the vector of estimated coefficients, xi
is the mean of the variable of interest, s.d.(xi) is its standard deviation, and
bβi is the estimated
coefficient. aThe predicted probabilities are calculated at mean levels of the explanatory variables
and each dummy variable set to 0.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics - Bivariate Probit
Total Men Women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Promotions .1611 .3676 .1711 .3767 .1492 .3563
Stays .7005 .4581 .7006 .4581 .7005 .4581
Experience 259.0338 15.8997 268.1836 15.3994 248.1761 15.8019
Employer Tenure 135.48 135.3122 135.9059 137.2786 134.9746 132.9661
Positional Tenure 33.5766 34.7078 35.0704 36.2396 31.804 32.7162
Training Required .5996 .49 .6002 .4899 .599 .4902
Hours worked per Week 42.2466 9.0017 44.1981 9.3538 39.9309 7.9691
Highest Grade Completed 13.113 2.307 12.8717 2.3772 13.3995 2.187
Hourly Wage 9.1322 4.6638 9.8398 4.8912 8.2924 4.2287
Supervise Work of Others .3945 .4888 .4258 .4945 .3573 .4793
AFQT Score 43.2814 28.5872 42.7572 29.906 43.9036 26.9312
Change in Marital Status .1005 .3007 .0935 .2911 .1089 .3116
In Home MSAa .6529 .4761 .6525 .4762 .6533 .476
Non-White .4064 .4912 .3978 .4895 .4166 .4931
Observations 5600 3039 2561
The sample includes all respondents who worked in both 1989 and 1990. Experience and Employer
Tenure are measured in weeks. Positional Tenure is measured in months. Experience is measured prior
to current employer. Employer tenure is measured prior to current position. aThis variable equals 1 if
the respondent is in the same MSA in 1989 that was reported in 1979.
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Table 3.4: Bivariate Probit Estimation
Full Sample
Estimates Marginal Effects
yi1 yi2 ∆Pr[yi1 = 1, yi2 = 1] ∆Pr[yi2 = 1|yi1 = 1] ∆Pr[yi1 = 1]




Employer Tenure .0058∗∗∗ -.0002 .0046 -.0243 .1171
(.0006) (.001)
(Employer Tenure)2 -6.14e-06∗∗∗ 7.67e-07
(1.17e-6) (1.55e-6)
Positional Tenure .006∗∗∗ -.0033 -.0171 -.033 .0415
(.0019) (.0024)
(Positional Tenure)2 -2.02e-05 1.14e-05
(1.39e-05) (1.7e-5)
Special Training Required .041 .0316 .0081 .0069 .0128
(.0397) (.045)
Hours worked per Week .0052∗∗∗ .004 .0093 .008 .0145
(.002) (.0029)
Highest Grade Completed .01 .0311∗∗ .0183 .0219 .0072
(.011) (.0125)
Hourly Wage .0361∗∗∗ -.002 -.0013 -.0154 .05
(.0046) (.0066)
Supervise Work of Others -.1485∗∗∗ .1558∗∗∗ .0382 .0501 -.0491
(.0394) (.0508)
AFQT 4.30e-05 4.00e-04 .003 .0038 .0004
(.0009) (.0011)
Change in Marital Status -.1469∗∗ . -.0014 .0132 -.0486
(.0593)
In Home MSA .0897∗∗ . .0006 -.007 .0274
(.0396)
Female .0772∗∗ -.0899∗ -.0206 -.0333 .0237
(.0393) (.0475)











Standard errors are in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.













where Φ(·) and Φ2(·, ρ) represent the standard normal and bivariate normal distribution functions, respec-
tively, Xj is the vector of means for the explanatory variables excluding variable i, cβj is the vector of estimated coefficients,
xi is the mean of the variable of interest, s.d.(xi) is its standard deviation, and
cβi is the estimated coefficient. aThe
predicted probabilities are calculated at mean levels of the explanatory variables and each dummy variable set to 0.
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Table 3.5: Bivariate Probit Estimation
Women
Estimates Marginal Effects
yi1 yi2 ∆ Pr[yi1 = 1, yi2 = 1] ∆ Pr[yi2 = 1|yi1 = 1] ∆ Pr[yi1 = 1]




Employer Tenure .0071∗∗∗ -.0032 -.0096 -.035 .1306
(.0009) (.0027)
(Employer Tenure)2 -7.9e-06∗∗∗ 4.36e-06
(1.86e-6) (3.58e-06)
Positional Tenure .0019 -.0047 -.0118 -.0187 .0164
(.0033) (.0037)
(Positional Tenure)2 -2.27e-06 2.25e-05
(2.61e-05) (2.67e-05)
Special Training Required .0592 .0753 .0191 .0207 .0181
(.0597) (.0778)
Hours Worked per Week .0121∗∗∗ .0091 .0212 .0208 .0291
(.003) (.0073)
Highest Grade Completed -.0099 .0171 .0057 .0090 -.0068
(.0165) (.0213)
Hourly Wage .0344∗∗∗ -.0021 .0075 .0006 .0430
(.0072) (.0145)
Supervise Work of Others -.2052∗∗∗ .246∗∗∗ .0324 .0373 -.0684
(.0598) (.0923)
AFQT .0018 -.0006 -.0002 -.0033 .0148
(.0015) (.0019)
Change in Marital Status -.1855∗∗ . -.0128 -.0040 -.0615
(.0899)
In Home MSA .0985∗ . .0064 .0020 .0296
(.0597)











Standard errors are in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.













where Φ(·) and Φ2(·, ρ) represent the standard normal and bivariate normal distribution functions, respec-
tively, Xj is the vector of means for the explanatory variables excluding variable i, cβj is the vector of estimated coefficients,
xi is the mean of the variable of interest, s.d.(xi) is its standard deviation, and
cβi is the estimated coefficient. aThe
predicted probabilities are calculated at mean levels of the explanatory variables and each dummy variable set to 0.
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Table 3.6: Bivariate Probit Estimation
Men
Estimates Marginal Effects
yi1 yi2 ∆ Pr[yi1 = 1, yi2 = 1] ∆ Pr[yi2 = 1|yi1 = 1] ∆ Pr[yi1 = 1]




Employer Tenure .0049∗∗∗ 1.30e-05 .0100 -.0154 .0996
(.0007) (.001)
(Employer Tenure)2 -5.20e-06 6.20e-07
(1.5e-06) (1.7e-06)
Positional Tenure .0092∗∗∗ -.003 -.0178 -.0372 .0546
(.0024) (.0031)
(Positional Tenure)2 -3.6e-05∗∗ 9.50e-06
(1.7e-05) (2.1e-05)
Special Training Required .0275 -.0024 -.0006 -.0033 .0082
(.0536) (.0588)
Hours Worked per Week .0013 8.70e-05 .0002 -.0008 .0037
(.0026) (.0034)
Highest Grade Completed .024∗ .0383∗∗ .0250 .0266 .0169
(.0142) (.0158)
Hourly Wage .0369∗∗∗ -.0065 -.0080 -.0244 .0510
(.0059) (.0077)
Supervise Work of Others -.1036∗ .1477∗∗ .0409 .0580 -.0326
(.0542) (.061)
AFQT -.0013 .0005 .0042 .0091 -.0116
(.0012) (.0014)
Change in Marital Status -.1071 . -.0002 .0105 -.0337
(.0803)
In Home MSA .0778 . .0001 -.0067 .0229
(.053)











Standard errors are in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.













where Φ(·) and Φ2(·, ρ) represent the standard normal and bivariate normal distribution functions, respec-
tively, Xj is the vector of means for the explanatory variables excluding variable i, cβj is the vector of estimated coefficients,
xi is the mean of the variable of interest, s.d.(xi) is its standard deviation, and
cβi is the estimated coefficient. aThe
predicted probabilities are calculated at mean levels of the explanatory variables and each dummy variable set to 0.
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Chapter 4
Job Attachment Patterns of Men and Women:
Promotion Expectations and Experience
(with Malathi Velamuri)
4.1 Introduction
In documenting the pattern of lifetime jobs in the US using data from
the 1968-1978 period, Hall(1982) found that on average, women’s jobs were of
substantially shorter duration relative to men’s jobs. According to Hall, this
higher job turnover for women was a consequence of the long stretches of time
they spent out of the labor force. Researchers have studied the implications
of these gender differences in turnover behavior on various labor market out-
comes. Ureta (1995) examined the effect of non-employment spells on wage
growth, by studying the timing and frequency of non-work spells for a sample
of young, white workers drawn from the National Longitudinal Surveys. Her
estimates suggest that 12% of the male-female wage gap can be explained by
women’s intermittent employment spells.
One channel through which gender differences in job turnover translate
into the gender wage gap is through differential rates of promotion for men
and women; some contend that women face a ‘glass ceiling’ that prevents their
upward mobility in internal labor markets (Gjerde, 2002). According to this
theory, since training workers is a costly activity, firms are only willing to
invest in those workers from whom they expect to recoup the costs of training.
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Given that the expected time horizon to recover these costs is shorter for
women, firms are unwilling to train their women workers. And since training
is invariably a prerequisite for promotion, promotion rates for women tend
to be smaller than those for men. These differences in promotion rates then
translate into a gender wage-gap.1
A significant increase in the labor force participation of women over
the past few decades has motivated researchers to re-examine job turnover
behavior by men and women. There is evidence suggesting that more recent
cohorts of women are as concerned about their careers as men, have a higher
propensity to stay on their jobs and are exhibiting a strong attachment to the
labor market.2 We would expect firms to treat these women - the ‘stayers’
- no differently from men. However, women workers are still a heterogenous
group comprising both ‘stayers’ and ‘quitters,’ with higher average turnover
rates than men. If firms cannot distinguish between the two types of women
workers based on observables, statistical discrimination would still result in
lower promotion rates for women and a persistence of the wage gap. If, on the
other hand, the stayers could successfully signal their intentions to stay in the
labor force and separate themselves from the quitters, they could overcome
internal labor market discrimination.
Prisinzano (2004) estimated a bivariate probit model of job-stays and
promotions for men and women. His results indicate that the error terms be-
tween the job-stay equation and the promotions equations are correlated for
men, suggesting that the unobservables affecting the stay decision are corre-
1Wages usually grow with promotions; McCue’s(1996) estimates suggest that between
9%-18% of wage growth is due to promotions.
2See Prisinzano (2004), Light and Ureta(1992), and references therein.
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lated with those affecting whether they receive a promotion or not. In contrast,
the hypothesis that the estimated correlation between the error terms in the
two equations for women is equal to zero cannot be rejected, implying that
whether women receive a promotion offer or not is uncorrelated with their
job-stay decisions. This seemingly strange result is the motivation for the cur-
rent paper. It is our view that women who are concerned about their careers
are using job attachment as a signal to indicate their attachment to the la-
bor force. We expect women with little or no job market experience to have
lower job turnover rates compared to men of similar experience, all else equal.
Therefore, during this period, we expect women to exhibit less sensitivity to
expectations of promotion, relative to men. This rationale also suggests that
once women have gained adequate labor market experience and revealed them-
selves as stayers, their job attachment patterns should respond more closely to
their expectations of promotions. Hence, we expect women with adequate job
market experience to reveal job attachment patterns similar to those of men.
Accordingly, we use a longitudinal dataset to study how the expectation
of promotion affects men’s and women’s decision to stay on a job and whether
this relative pattern varies with the amount of labor market experience. The
data also contains information on workers’ perceived chances of promotion in
their current job. We expect workers who are concerned about their careers
to be sensitive to the potential for career growth in their firms. We examine
how turnover behavior responds to this subjective likelihood of promotion and
how this response differs by gender and experience level. Our results suggest
that individuals with low expectations of promotion are less likely to stay on
their jobs relative to those with high expectations of promotion. We also find
evidence that women are more likely than men to stay on a job all else equal.
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Furthermore, women with low promotion expectations are more likely than
comparable men to stay on a job and this difference is more pronounced early
in careers. The fact that the difference diminishes with experience supports
our hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 4.22 gives a de-
scription of our data, the variables used in our analysis and some descriptives
for our sample. In section 4.4, we describe the empirical models we use in our
estimation, in section 4 we discuss the results and present our conclusions in
section 4.5.
4.2 Data and Descriptives
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
for the following survey years: 1979-83, 1996, 1998 and 2000.We restricted our
sample to those who exhibited a reasonable attachment to the labor market.
We eliminated respondents who worked for less than 15 weeks per year or less
than 20 hours per week in any year. We also eliminated respondents who were
either self-employed, working in a farming occupation or industry, or in the
armed forces. This restriction removes those individuals that face considerably
different job and promotion structures than the typical worker.
The information on job changes and the subjective perception of pro-
motion possibilities on the current job are of particular interest for the present
study. Accordingly, we identify the respondent as a ‘job-stayer’ in a particular
year if he or she reported that the main job that year was also the main job in
the previous year. In the 1979 through 1982 surveys, the NLSY includes the
respondent’s assessment of whether the chances for promotion in the current
job are good. The responses are coded as: 1. Not true at all; 2. Not too true;
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3. Somewhat true and 4. Very true. In the 1996 and 1998 surveys, a similar
question is asked as follows: “Do you believe it is possible for you to get a
promotion with this employer in the next two years?”, and the respondent
replied with a yes/no. One problem in comparing these questions is that in
the 1979-82 surveys, the question does not specify a time horizon while in the
1996 and 1998, the scope of the question is limited to two years. However, we
believe that the respondents interpreted the question as referring to a short
time horizon in the 1979-82 surveys, especially given that they were all be-
tween 15 and 25 years old. We therefore combine the first two categories in
the 1979-82 survey responses - Not true at all and Not too true - into one,
and label this as “Low chances of promotion”, and combine the other two
categories - Somewhat true and Very true - into the “High chances of promo-
tion category. In the 1996 and 1998 surveys, if the response to the promotion
question was No, this was categorized as “Low chances of promotion” and if
it was Yes, it was categorized as “High chances of promotion.” This way, we
construct a comparable measure of subjective perception of promotion chances
on the current job.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the fraction of job-stayers and job-movers
among men and women for the two time periods, categorized by their self-
perceived chances of promotion. In the 1979-82 period, among workers who
feel they have little or no chance of promotion in their current job, a signifi-
cantly larger fraction of women workers stayed on their jobs. By contrast, a
much higher fraction of men stay on in jobs in which they think that the like-
lihood of promotion is very high, relative to women. Among the job-movers,
there’s no discernible pattern among women while a significant fraction among
men, nearly 60%, move jobs even when they think they have good chances of
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promotion. We observe the same pattern in the 1996-1998 period.
The summary statistics for our sample are presented in table 4.3. Women
constituted less than half the sample, as did non-whites. Although we do not
see too many differences between men and women in terms of the marital sta-
tus variables, on average, women had more children. Women were also slightly
younger and had about an extra half-year of education. This translated into
a lower average level of potential experience for women. As expected, women
had lower mean wages, compared to men. However, a higher fraction of women
stayed on their jobs from one year to the next compared to men, despite a sub-
stantially higher fraction of women reported facing low chances of promotion
in their current jobs.
4.3 Model Specification
In the present paper, we examine the likelihood of an individual re-
maining on a job. It is possible to estimate this decision using a simple probit
model of the following form:
yi = Xβ + εi (4.1)
where y = 1 if the individual stayed on the current job and y = 0 if she did
not stay on the job. X is a set of covariates, β is a vector of parameters to
be estimated, and ε is assumed to have a standard normal distribution. The
set of covariates includes characteristics pertaining to the individual and her
job. This model is appealing because it is easy to implement and interpret.
However, the model does not take advantage of the panel nature of the data.
We can incorporate the panel nature of the data into the probit model and
account for omitted variable bias by estimating a random-effects specification
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of equation 4.1. The specification used in this paper follows the model proposed
by Guilkey and Murphy (1993).3 The model is as follows:
y∗it = Xitβ + µi + υit (4.2)
where Xit is a set of covariates for individual i at time t and β are parameters
to be estimated. µi and υit are independent random variables with µi char-
acterizing individual i and following a normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance σ2µ) while υit is a random disturbance distributed as N(0, σ
2
υ). Given
these conditions, we have the following:












Following from a simple probit, we observe the following:
yit = 1 if y
∗
it > 0 (4.5)
yit = 0 if y
∗
it ≤ 0.

































3Heckman and Willis (1976) and Chamberlain (1980) both present a similar model.
Hsiao (1986) gives a useful discussion of the literature. Butler and Moffitt (1982) describe
a procedure to calculate the likelihood function.
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where Φ represents the standard normal distribution, N is the number of
individuals, and T is the number of observations for individual i. Xit is a set
of covariates for individual i at time t and β, µ, and ρ are parameters to be
estimated.4
In order to capture the differential effects of gender, promotion expec-
tations, and experience on the probability of staying on a job, we adopt a
‘difference in difference in difference’ specification of Xit.
5 First, we examine
how the probability of staying on a job differs by promotion expectations.
Any difference in the probability is likely due to simple concerns regarding
the career path. That is, individuals may be less likely to remain on a job if
they do not expect to be promoted. Second, we examine how these concerns
differ by gender. It is possible that women and men differ in how promotion
expectations change their likelihood of staying on a job. The presumption is
that women may have different expectations about career length. We have
the following ‘difference-in-difference’ approach after combining the above two
analyses:
∆2 =(Pr(yit = 1)
L
F − Pr(yit = 1)HF ) (4.7)
−(Pr(yit = 1LM − Pr(yit = 1)HM)
where Pr(yit = 1) represents the probability of staying on a job, the super-
scripts L and H represent individuals who have either low or high expectations
of promotion, and the subscripts F and M represent females and males, respec-
tively. Equation 4.7 assumes that the difference in the probability of staying
4A pooled probit will provide consistent estimates of βσε with incorrect standard errors.
However, these estimates will equal the random effects estimates only if σ2µ = 0. If σ
2
µ 6= 0
then the preferred estimation method is the variance-components model of equation 4.6.
5The specification presented follows the example of Hamermesh and Trejo (2000).
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would be similar across promotion expectation if not for gender. The equation
is represented in the probit framework by:
Pr(yit = 1) =zitγ + δ1L + δ2F + δ3(L ∗ F ) + εit (4.8)
where zit is a set of covariates and γ is the corresponding set of parameters to be
estimated. L is a dummy variable for an individual who has low expectations
for promotion and F is a dummy variable for females. δ1 and δ2 are the
associated coefficients to be estimated. δ3 is the coefficient that identifies the
difference in difference expressed in equation 4.7. Lastly, we examine whether
differences in the probability of staying on a job given promotion expectations
and experience level differ by gender. Following the form above, we have:
∆3 =[(Pr(yit = 1)LF − Pr(yit = 1)HF )− (Pr(yit = 1LM )− Pr(yit = 1)HM )]I (4.9)
−[(Pr(yit = 1)LF − Pr(yit = 1)HF )− (Pr(yit = 1LM )− Pr(yit = 1)HM )]E
where the subscripts I and E represent individuals who are inexperienced and
experienced and all other notation is defined as above. However, rather than
assign an indicator for ‘inexperience,’ we use a continuous measure of experi-
ence and its square. This difference is incorporated in the probit framework
as follows:
Pr(yit = 1) =zitγ + δ1L + δ2F + δ3(L ∗ F ) + δ4E + δ5E2 (4.10)
+ δ6(L ∗ E) + δ7(L ∗E2) + δ8(F ∗ E) + δ9(F ∗ E2)
+ δ10(L ∗ F ∗ E) + δ11(L ∗ F ∗E2) + εit
where E and E2 are potential experience and its square, respectively while δ4
and δ5 are the associated coefficients. δ6 and δ7, and δ8 and δ9 are the pairs of
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coefficients that identify the difference-in-differences for low promotion expec-
tations and inexperience, and gender and inexperience, respectively. δ10 and
δ10 are the coefficients that identify the ‘difference-in-difference-in-difference’
expressed in equation 4.9. The remaining notation is as defined above.
The above specification allows for comparisons across different groups.
We are interested in the following differences. First, we are concerned with
the difference in the likelihood of staying across gender given low promotion
expectations and the same difference given high promotion expectations. The
former difference is represented by δ2 + δ3 + δ8 + δ9 + δ10 + δ11 while the
latter difference is represented by δ2 + δ8 + δ9. Second, we are interested in
the difference in the likelihood of staying across promotion expectation given
gender. For men, this difference is represented by δ1 + δ6 + δ7. The same
difference for women is represented by δ1 + δ6 + δ7 + δ8 + δ9 + δ10 + δ11. Lastly,
we are interested in how the difference in the likelihood of staying between low
and high promotion expectation men differs from the analogous difference for
women after controlling for experience level. This difference is represented by
δ10 + δ11.
4.4 Estimates
The results from the random-effects probit models are presented in
table 4.4. The estimate of the correlation between the decision to stay on a
job in year t and the same decision in year t + 1, denoted by ρ, is positive and
significant. This result suggests that the random effects probit is the preferred
estimation.6 The implication of the positive sign on the correlation is that
6In general, there is little difference between the pooled estimates and the random effects
estimates. However, the estimate of ρ is significantly different from zero in each model
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individuals who stay on their job in year t are more likely to stay on their job
in year t + 1; in other words, certain individuals may be ‘stayers’ while others
are ‘non-stayers.’
4.4.1 Basic Results
An important determinant of staying on a job is changes in marital
status. We define changes in marital status for an individual as staying single
from year t to t + 1, remaining married from year t to t + 1, getting married
between year t and t + 1, or going from married to single between year t and
t + 1. Individuals who remain married or who get married are more likely to
stay on a job than individuals who are single, all else equal. The former group
is 35% more likely to remain on a job while the latter group is 23.5% more
likely to remain on a job.7 It is likely that this result reflects the notion that
these two groups are either more stable or desire more stability than single
individuals. The stability is likely due to the fact that individuals who are
married have a dependent and any decision is a ‘joint’ decision. The coeffi-
cient on becoming single between two time periods is positive and significant.
However, the marginal effect is considerably smaller than the effects associated
with marriage (14%). It is not surprising that there is a small difference in
the likelihood of staying on a job for individuals who become single and those
who remain single. This difference may reflect the fact that ‘newly’ single
individuals are not that removed from marriage and have not fully realized
their single status.
estimated. Given this fact, we report only the results of the random effects probits.
7The predicted probability of remaining on a job at the mean levels of all continuous
variables and each dummy variable set to 0 is .5118.
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Presumably, two important considerations that affect job turnover are
the wage and the potential for promotion within the firm. The former reflects
the cost to the individual of leaving the job. The coefficient on the log of the
hourly wage is positive and significant. The marginal effect associated with
the coefficient is sizable at 28.76%. This result coincides with the expectation
that the higher the wage, the higher the cost to the individual of leaving the
job. The latter is likely important to those individuals who are concerned
with a career and the associated benefits. As such, we expect individuals with
low promotion expectations to be less likely to stay on the job. Our estimate
accords with this notion; individuals who have low expectations of promotion
on their jobs are less likely to stay on their jobs.
The effect of potential experience on job turnover seems counter-intuitive;
search theory predicts that job turnover will be high at low levels of experi-
ence as workers search for a good ‘match.’ Once good job matches are made,
turnover is expected to decline. Thus, we would expect the coefficient on the
linear experience term to be positive and the one on the quadratic term to be
negative. Our results suggest the opposite pattern. A possible explanation for
this pattern is that there are differential effects of experience by gender and
by promotion expectation. We explore this hypothesis in subsequent specifi-
cations. However, it is important to note that the marginal effect associated
with potential experience is negligible.8
The coefficient on the gender variable is of particular interest to the
present study. Recent studies have found that women are more likely than
8The marginal effect of potential experience is calculated as the mean of effects in the
sample.
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men to stay at jobs.9 Our result is consistent with this finding. The coefficient
on the female dummy variable is significant and positive. It suggests that
women are 12% more likely than men to stay on a job all else equal.
4.4.2 Gender-Promotion Expectation Comparisons
Column 3 of table 4.4 presents the results of the double-difference es-
timation. The coefficients of particular interest are those associated with the
variables that are used in the ‘double-difference’ presented in equation 4.7.
These variables are dummy variables for female and having low expectations
of promotion. The results from the basic specification presented in column 2
of table 4.4 suggest that women are 12% more likely to remain on a job than
men all else equal. It is not obvious why women are more likely to stay on jobs
than men. The unconditional probabilities of staying on a job are very close.
In our sample, 55.5% of men stayed on jobs while 56.9% of women stay on jobs.
This difference represents only a 2.5% increase. A reasonable explanation for
the estimated difference is that women may face a form of discrimination in
hiring practices. Under this condition, women may be less likely to receive
a new job offer. As such, women may hold onto jobs longer because the job
search costs they face are higher than job search costs faced by men.
If individuals are concerned with career ‘growth’, promotion expecta-
tions are likely an important consideration in the stay decision. The basic
specification supports this notion. That is, individuals with low promotion
expectations are less likely to stay on a job. The presumption is that they
will incur the costs of leaving a job in order to move to a job with more pro-
motion potential. It is also possible that individuals who have low promotion
9For example, Prisinzano (2004).
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expectations recognize they are not productive at the job. In this case, indi-
viduals may leave in order to find a job at which they are productive. The
estimation presented here does not distinguish between these possibilities but
as presented in the previous section, individuals with low promotion expec-
tations are 15% less likely to stay on a job all else equal. Considering the
magnitude of the marginal effect, it appears that promotion expectations are
an important determinant of staying on a job.
The coefficient on the interaction between female and low promotion
expectations identifies the double difference. It captures any difference in
the probability of staying on a job across promotion expectation that is due
to gender. The coefficient on the interaction is insignificant at conventional
levels. As such, it appears that women are more likely to stay on jobs than
men regardless of the promotion expectations. However, if women do need
to signal attachment to the labor market, it is likely that women with low
levels of experience will differ from men with low levels of experience but
women with high levels of experience will not differ from men with high levels
of experience. In order to capture this effect, we estimated the specification
presented in equation 4.10.
4.4.3 Gender-Promotion Expectation-Experience Comparisons
The results of the triple difference estimation are presented in column 6
of table 4.4 and the marginal effects for the variables of interest are presented
table 4.5. In the case of the control variables, the results of the triple differ-
ence are similar to the results of the previous specifications. In the previous
estimation, we found little evidence of ‘job-shopping.’ We found that the net
effect of potential experience decreased the likelihood of staying on a job. In
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the current specification, we also find this result but the inclusion of the set
of interactions that identify the triple difference changes the interpretation.10
The net effect of potential experience differs by gender, promotion expecta-
tion, and gender-promotion expectation group. In the case of men with high
promotion expectations, the effect is simply the net of the coefficients on the
potential experience variables. The result suggests that as potential experi-
ence increases the likelihood of staying on a job for men with high promotion
expectations decreases.11 This result is mild evidence of negative selection for
men. In the previous specifications, we also found that individuals with low
promotion expectations are less likely to stay on a job. In the current specifi-
cation, we see a different result for men. The marginal effect associated with
the coefficient on low promotion expectations also accounts for the interaction
between this variable and the potential experience variables. The net marginal
effect is .0004. This result suggests that men with low promotion expectations
are .09% more likely to stay on a job than men with high promotion expecta-
tions.12 Even though this result is negligible, it may reflect a negative selection
of men into long tenure. That is, men who have low promotion expectations
are also less likely to find comparable jobs in the labor market and therefore,
stay on the current job.
10The set of coefficients that identifies the triple difference is Female, Low, Low*Female,
Potential Experience, the square of Potential Experience, Potential Experience*Low, (Po-
tential Experience)2*Low, Potential Experience*Female, (Potential Experience)2*Female,
Potential Experience*Low*Female, and (Potential Experience)2*Low*Female. The χ2
statistic for joint significance of the full set is 192.71 and its associated p-value is .0000.
11The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on the potential experience
variables is 21.99 and its associated p-value is .0000.
12The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficient on low promotion expectations
and the interactions with the potential experience variables is 87.29 and its associated p-
value is .0000.
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In the double-difference specification, we found that women were 12%
more likely than men to stay on a job all else equal. In the current specification,
we also find that women are more likely to stay on a job than men. The
marginal effect associated with women also takes into account the interaction
of the potential experience variables and the female dummy variable. This
effect suggests that women who have high promotion expectations are 16.5%
more likely than men with high promotion expectations to stay on a job.13 A
possible explanation for this result is that since women are less likely to receive
a promotion, when they are likely to receive a promotion they remain on the
job. The presumption is that men who have high promotion expectations
may be able to find a comparable job whereas women are not able to find a
comparable job. A possible explanation for why they are not able to find a
comparable job is our signaling story. Women must signal attachment to the
labor market in order to receive promotions (and the likely wage increases).
If attachment to the labor market is observed noisily from outside a firm,
women will stay on current jobs longer than men all else equal. The difference
is highlighted when we control for promotion expectations in the estimation.
We also find that women with low promotion expectations are less likely to
stay on a job than women with high promotion expectations. The marginal
effect associated with being a women with low promotion expectations takes
into account the coefficients on the female and low promotion expectations
variables as well as each of the included interactions. The results suggest that
women with low promotion expectations are 13.8% less likely to stay on a job
than women with high promotion expectations.14 Contrary to the result for
13The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on female and the interactions
with the potential experience variables is 22.61 and its associated p-value is .0000.
14The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on low and the interactions with
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men, it appears that there is positive selection of women into long tenure.
Given the present specification, it is possible to compare across gender
and promotion expectations. A useful comparison is women to men given low
promotion expectations. This difference in the likelihood staying on a job is
due to the turning on of the female indicator as well as the female-potential ex-
perience and female-low interactions. The marginal effect is .0122 at the mean
of experience and suggests that women with low promotion expectations are
2.5% more likely to stay on job than their male counterparts.15 This differ-
ence in the likelihood of staying across gender increases if we consider men
and women with a potential experience level that is one standard deviation
below the mean. Women with low promotion expectations and ‘low’ potential
experience are 16.6% more likely than comparable men to stay on a job. This
result is of particular interest in our study. Our hypothesis is that early in
their careers women are likely to respond to promotion expectations differently
than men. Specifically, we expect women who are early in their careers to stay
on jobs for which they have low promotion expectations more often than men.
The reason for this difference is that women early in their careers must signal
an attachment to the labor market that men do not have to signal. As such,
‘job-shopping’ by women is a negative signal regarding labor force attachment.
It suggests that women who have low promotion expectations and are inexpe-
rienced are more likely to stay on a job than their male counterparts. Later
in the career, the difference in the likelihood of staying on a job between men
and women with low promotion expectations diminishes. For individuals with
a potential experience level that is one standard deviation above the mean,
female and potential experience variables is 131.82 and its associated p-value is .0000.
15The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on female and the female-
potential experience and female-low interactions is 43.15 and its associated p-value is .0000.
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women with low promotion expectations are only 12.8% more likely to remain
on a job than comparable men. Our hypothesis is that men and women’s
behavior in response to promotion expectations should be indistinguishable at
high levels of experience. Even though there is still a difference, this result
supports this notion.
4.4.3.1 Early Sample
As noted in section 4.2, the promotion expectations question in the
1979-82 surveys had four possible responses while the corresponding question
in the 1996-98 surveys had only two possible responses. In pooling the data, it
was necessary to collapse the four response categories from the earlier period
into two categories. To ensure that this restriction is not affecting our results,
we estimated the triple-difference specifications for the 1979-82 and the 1996-
1998 periods separately. In estimating the specifications for the earlier period,
we combined the two responses ‘Not true at all’ and ‘Not too true’ into one
category, ‘Low promotion expectations’ but kept the other two responses -
‘Somewhat true’ and ‘Very true’ - separate. The results are presented in table
4.6 and the marginal effects for the variables of interest are in table 4.7.
The results for the education, wages, children, living in MSA, race and
marital variables are all qualitatively similar to those of the pooled sample.
The coefficients on the detailed promotion expectation categories have the
expected signs; individuals who perceive their chances of promotion to be
small or moderately good are less likely to stay on the job relative to those
who believe that they have very good chances of getting promoted. Unlike in
the pooled sample, the net effect of potential experience is positive. However
the marginal effect still remains small and furthermore, the coefficients on the
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linear and quadratic terms are not jointly significant.16
Similar to the findings in the pooled sample, we find that women are
more likely to stay on their job relative to men, regardless of promotion expec-
tations. Specifically, we find that women are 29.5%, 18.3% and 21.3% more
likely to stay on the job than their male counterparts for all low, moderate
and high promotion expectation categories, respectively. 17 Given that most of
the individuals in this sub-sample have low levels of potential experience, this
results supports our hypothesis that women stay on jobs to signal attachment
to the labor force. When we consider these marginal effects at one standard
deviation above and below the mean level of potential experience, the results
also support our hypothesis. However, we find that as potential experience
increases, the gender differences in the relative probabilities of staying on the
job also increase. This results is contrary to our expectation that as women
gain experience, their response to promotion expectations should be similar
to that of men. However, it is possible that signaling takes longer than 3.89
years.18
4.4.3.2 Late Sample
The results of the triple difference estimation for the 1996-1998 period
are presented in column 4 of table 4.6 while the marginal effects associated with
the variables of interest are in table 4.8. In the case of the control variables,
these results are very similar to the results of the full sample specification.
One notable change is the coefficient on the number of children. In the full
16The χ2 statistic for joint significance is 1.64 with a p-value of .4407.
17The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the respective coefficients are 28.19, 22.02 and
11.50 with associated p-values of .0001, .0012 and .0093 respectively.
18This value is the level of potential experience at one standard deviation above the mean.
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sample estimation, the coefficient is significant and suggests that increasing
the number of children decreases the likelihood of staying on a job by 3.2%.
In the current specification, the coefficient on this variable is negative but
is insignificant and carries a considerably smaller marginal effect (-1.3%). A
possible explanation for this difference is the fact that the children in the
household are more likely to be of school age and therefore, individuals do not
have to take care of the children. One other change is the effect of experience on
the likelihood of staying on a job. In the full sample estimation, we found that
experience had a negative effect on the likelihood of staying on a job, albeit
a very small one. In this estimation, we find that experience has a positive
net effect on the likelihood of staying on a job. The effect is also considerably
larger in magnitude than the effect we found in the full sample estimation
(2.5% vs. -.6%). This result aligns with the expectation that individuals are
more likely to ‘job shop’ at low levels of experience and are more stable as
they gain experience. Similar to the result from the full sample estimation, we
find that men with low promotion expectations are 3.5% more likely to stay
on a job than men with high promotion expectations all else equal. This result
supports the notion that for men, there is negative selection into long tenure.
We find that women with low promotion expectations are 6.8% less
likely than women with high promotion expectations to stay on a job. In
each of the previous estimations, we found that women are more likely to stay
on jobs all else equal. This estimation yields a slightly different result. At
the mean level of potential experience (17 years), women with high promo-
tion expectations are almost 10% more likely than men with high promotion
expectations to stay on a job all else equal.19 However, women with low pro-
19The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficient on the female indicator variable
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motion expectations are 1% less likely than their male counterparts to stay
on a job all else equal.20 This result supports our hypothesis that as women
gain experience in the labor market (and successfully signal attachment) they
will behave no differently than men. The fact that women with low promotion
expectations are less likely than their male counterparts to stay on their job
may reflect the fact that women’s careers are delayed by the need to signal
attachment to the labor force.
We find that women with low promotion expectations and potential
experience that is one standard deviation below the mean level (13.93 years)
are 2.6% more likely to stay on jobs than their male counterparts all else equal.
We also find that women with a potential experience level that is one standard
deviation above the mean level (20.7 years) and low promotion expectations
are 13% more likely to remain on a job than their male counterparts. It
appears that the gender difference in the likelihood of staying on a job given
low promotion expectations first decreases and then increases. We expect the
difference to tend toward zero and perhaps change direction as women ‘catch
up’ with men. It is possible that the result we find is due to the fact that
women may enter the labor force later than men. These women will have
high levels of potential experience but still be early in their careers. In an
effort to explore this result, we estimate the triple difference using the sample
of individuals that appear in both time periods in the following section. This
sample comprises individuals who are serious about their careers and therefore,
should behave as our signaling model suggests. It also eliminates the possibility
and the interactions with the potential experience variables is 9.48 with a p-value of .0235.
20The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on female and the interactions
with low and potential experience variables is 29.97 and its associated p-value is .0000.
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that our results are driven by women who know they are going to drop out of
the labor force and therefore, do not respond to promotion expectations.
4.4.3.3 Individuals in Both Samples
The results of the triple difference estimation are presented in column 6
of table 4.6 while the marginal effects of the variables of interest are presented
in table 4.9. The results for the control variables do not differ significantly
from the main results presented in table 4.4 with the exception of the coeffi-
cient on the education variable. This coefficient is insignificant in the present
specification but is significant in each of the other specifications. The marginal
effect is also considerably smaller in magnitude than other specifications at just
.0025 percentage points. It also appears that experience level has a negative
net effect but is again relatively small at -.8% for men with high promotion
expectations.
The advantage to running the triple difference with just the sample
of individuals who appear in both time periods is that we can eliminate the
possibility that our results are driven by women who are not serious about
their careers. That is, it is likely that the full sample contains some women
who know they are going to leave the labor force and therefore, remain on
jobs despite low promotion expectations. The results presented in table 4.6
suggest that our results are not driven by this group of women. Furthermore,
the results support our signaling story. As in previous estimations, we find
that women are more likely to stay on jobs than men all else equal. Women
with high promotion expectations are 18.66% more likely to remain on jobs
than their male counterparts all else equal while women with low promotion
expectations are 2.5% more likely to remain on jobs than their male counter-
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parts all else equal.21 The large difference in the likelihood of staying on a job
across gender for individuals with high promotion expectations likely reflects a
difference in the cost of finding a similar job. We also expect women to behave
more like men after they have successfully signalled attachment to the labor
force. If we consider individuals with an experience level that is one stan-
dard deviation below the mean, women with low promotion expectations are
21% more likely to remain on jobs than men with low promotion expectations
all else equal. For individuals with an experience level that is one standard
deviation above the mean level, women with low promotion expectations are
only 7.5% more likely than men to remain on a job all else equal. This result
supports our explanation. It suggests that women become more responsive
to promotion expectations after they have signalled labor force attachment.
Given that our sample consists of only individuals that are attached to the
labor force, this result is strong evidence for our signaling explanation.
4.5 Conclusion
Labor economists have explained the male-female wage differential as
a consequence of women’s historic lack of attachment to the labor force. How-
ever, with a rapid rise in the female labor force participation rate over the last
few decades, the career profiles of recent cohorts of women workers has under-
gone significant changes. Studies indicate that women are now more likely to
stay on their jobs compared to men of similar characteristics. In this paper,
we examine how job turnover relates to concerns regarding a career path. We
21The χ2 statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on female and the interactions
with potential experience variables is 12.07 and its associated p-value is .0071. The χ2
statistic for joint significance of the coefficients on female and the interactions with the low
and potential experience variables is 15.74 and its associated p-value is .0076.
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expect to see job turnover when promotion opportunities on the job are low.
Accordingly, we study the relationship between individuals’ expectations of
promotion on their jobs and their turnover behavior. We examine how this re-
lationship varies between men and women and with experience level. It is our
hypothesis that early on in their careers, women who are strongly committed to
a career are more likely to stay on their jobs, regardless of promotion opportu-
nities, in a bid to signal their commitment to current and potential employers.
However, once women have acquired adequate labor market experience and
their commitment to the labor force is no longer in question, we predict that
their turnover behavior will be more responsive to career opportunities and
will be similar to that of men.
We use longitudinal data for men and women from the NLSY to test
our predictions. In order to exploit the longitudinal nature of the data, we use
a random-effects probit model to estimate the probability that an individual
will stay on a job. We estimate three models: a basic model that includes
indicator variables for female and low promotion expectations; a model that
includes an interaction between female and low promotion expectations; and a
model that includes interactions between female, low promotion expectations,
and potential experience. The results from the basic specification suggest that
as expected, individuals with low expectations of promotion are less likely
to stay on their jobs than those with high expectations of promotion. This
result is repeated in the model that allows for differences in the effect of low
promotion expectations across gender. In this model, we also find that the
tendency of women to be more likely than men to stay on a job does not
vary with promotion expectations. In the third model, we find a different
result. We find that the difference across gender in the likelihood of staying
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on a job varies by potential experience. By evaluating the marginal effect of
low promotion expectations at different levels of potential experience we find
support for our hypothesis that early in their career, women are more likely
to stay on a job despite having low promotion expectations since they need to
signal their attachment to the labor force. Later in the career, women should
not differ from men in terms of their response to promotion expectations. Our
results suggest that while women are still more likely to remain on their job
in the face of low promotion expectations later in the career, the difference is
smaller than the difference early in the career.
We repeat the third model for three sub-samples: a 1979-82 sample, a
1996-98 sample and a sample of individuals that appear in both time periods.
The 1979-82 sample has more detailed information on promotion expectations.
This additional information strengthens our model but does not qualitatively
change the results. Similarly, the results from the 1996-98 sample do not differ
significantly from those of the pooled sample. By estimating the model using
the final sub-sample, we eliminate the possibility that our results are driven by
women who are not serious about their careers and therefore, unresponsive to
promotion expectations. These results further lend credence to our signaling
story that women at low levels of experience are more likely to stay on jobs
despite low promotion expectations than men of the same characteristics.
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Table 4.1: Self-Reported Promotion Expectations at Job
By Mobility: 1979-1983
Women
Job Stays No Stays
Response Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Not True at All .1324 .339 .2484 .4322
Not True .2295 .4206 .262 .4398
True .3411 .4742 .2868 .4524
Very True .297 .4571 .2027 .4021
Observations 1586 1771
Men
Job Stays No Stays
Response Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Not True at All .0874 .2826 .1639 .3703
Not True .1768 .3816 .2512 .4338
True .3654 .4817 .3288 .4699
Very True .3704 .4831 .256 .4365
Observations 1601 2074
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Table 4.2: Self-Reported Promotion Expectations at Job
By Mobility: 1996-1998
Women
Job Stays No Stays
Response Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Low Expectations .4461 .4972 .4564 .4983
Observations 2746 1514
Men
Job Stays No Stays
Response Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Low Expectations .3864 .4870 .4058 .4912
Observations 3305 1863
Note: The survey question was “Do you believe it is possible
for you to get a promotion with this employer in the next two
years?”. If the respondent replied “No”, this was coded as low
chances of promotion.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics - Entire Sample
Total Women Men
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Remained on job from t to t+1 .5617 .4962 .5692 .4952 .5553 .4970
Age 28.7269 8.1292 28.6096 8.1329 28.8277 8.1252
AFQT 44.4645 28.6104 43.8316 27.0915 45.0091 29.8462
Education 12.7589 2.1648 12.9290 2.0711 12.6126 2.2320
Potential Experience 10.9685 7.9043 10.6816 7.9769 11.2154 7.8334
Low Expectations of Promotion .4077 .4914 .4453 .4970 .3754 .4843
Log Hourly Wage 2.0009 .7648 1.8858 .7188 2.0999 .7890
Non-White .4284 .4949 .4352 .4958 .4226 .4940
In Metropolitan Statistical Area .7994 .4004 .8066 .3950 .7932 .4050
Number of Children .8238 1.1720 .9137 1.1803 .7464 1.1593
Stayed Single .4338 .4956 .4410 .4965 .4276 .4948
Stayed Married .3745 .4840 .3595 .4799 .3873 .4872
Single-Married .0549 .2278 .0579 .2336 .0523 .2227
Married-Single .0218 .1460 .0252 .1567 .0188 .1360
Observations 16394 7582 8812
116
Table 4.4: Random Effects Probit Estimation
Staying on a Job, Double and Triple Difference
Coefficient φ(X bβ) ∗ bβi Coefficient φ(X bβ) ∗ bβi Coefficient φ(X bβ) ∗ bβi
In Metropolitan Statistical Areaa -.1251∗∗∗ -.0499 -.1251∗∗∗ -.0499 -.1223∗∗∗ -.0485
(.0309) (.0309) (.0309)
Number of Children -.043∗∗∗ -.0154 -.043∗∗∗ -.0154 -.0429∗∗∗ -.0153
(.0132) (.0132) (.0132)
Education .0206∗∗∗ .0074 .0206∗∗∗ .0074 .0213∗∗∗ .0076
(.0079) (.0079) (.0079)
AFQT .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001 .0001
(.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
Log Hourly Wage .4119∗∗∗ .1472 .4119∗∗∗ .1472 .4104∗∗∗ .1459
(.0256) (.0256) (.0256)
Potential Experience -.0219∗∗∗ -.0000 -.0218∗∗∗ -.0000 -.0562∗∗∗ -.0031
(.0081) (.0081) (.0124)
(Potential Experience)2 .001∗∗∗ .001∗∗∗ .0022∗∗∗
(.0003) (.0003) (.0005)
Low Promotion Expectationsa -.2123∗∗∗ -.0843 -.211∗∗∗ -.0838 -.6628∗∗∗
(.0239) (.0328) (.074)
Female .1548∗∗∗ .0613 .1559∗∗∗ .0618 .1138∗
(.0261) (.0325) (.0647)
(Low Chances of Promotion)*Female . -.0026 -.0231 .1825∗
(.047) (.1021)
(Pot. Experience)*Female . . .0162
(.017)
(Pot. Experience)2*Female . . -.0007
(.0008)
(Pot. Experience)*Low . . .0988∗∗∗
(.0181)
(Pot. Experience)2*Low . . -.0034∗∗∗
(.0008)
(Pot. Experience)*Low*Female . . -.0639∗∗
(.0262)
(Pot. Experience)2*Low*Female . . .0029∗∗
(.0012)
Stayed Married .4807∗∗∗ .1833 .4808∗∗∗ .1833 .4821∗∗∗ .1872
(.0321) (.0321) (.0321)
Single-Married .312∗∗∗ .1219 .312∗∗∗ .1219 .3024∗∗∗ .1196
(.0505) (.0505) (.0506)
Married-Single .1831∗∗ .0724 .1831∗∗ .0724 .1821∗∗ .0725
(.0796) (.0796) (.0794)
Non-White -.0073 -.0029 -.0073 -.0030 .0035 .0014
(.0295) (.0295) (.0295)
Constant -.9031∗∗∗ -.9037∗∗∗ -.7655∗∗∗
(.0817) (.0823) (.0873)
Predicted Probability at X .5118 .5116 .479
Observations 16394 16394 16394
ρ .2211 .2211 .2183
Log-Likelihood -10365.49 -10365.49 -10326.6
χ2 statistic 1298.822 1298.843 1353.493
Groups 7903 7903 7903
Standard errors are in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
For the continuous variables, the marginal effect reported is the mean of the marginal effects in the sample. In the
case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is calculated as Φ(Xd=1 bβ)−Φ(Xd=0 bβ) where d = 1 and d = 0 represent
the dummy variable set to 1 and 0, respectively.aIndividuals are classified as having low expectations if they thought
a promotion was not likely in survey years 1979-1982 or they thought a promotion was not possible in the next 2 years
in survey years 1996 or 1998.
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Table 4.5: Triple Difference Marginal Effects
Base Probabilities
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Men - Low .403 .47942 .4927
Men - High .5586 .47898 .5092
Women - Low .4699 .4916 .556
Women - High .6193 .5579 .5659
Low vs. High Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.1493 -.0662 -.0098
Men -.1555 .0004 -.0164
Women vs. Men
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Low .0669 .0122 .0633
High .0607 .0789 .0567
The marginal effects are calculated as Φ(Xd=1 bβ) −
Φ(Xd=0 bβ) where d = 1 and d = 0 represent the set
of dummy variables set to 1 and 0, respectively.
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Table 4.6: Random Effects Probit Estimation
Staying on a Job by Time Period
79-83 96-98 Dual Samplea
Coefficient φ(X bβ) ∗ bβi Coefficient φ(X bβ) ∗ bβi Coefficient φ(X bβ) ∗ bβi
In Metropolitan Statistical Area -.1168∗∗∗ -.0465 -.1548∗∗∗ -.0608 -.0978∗∗ -.0239
(.0447) (.0505) (.0421)
Number of Children -.3232∗∗∗ -.1160 -.0240 -.0080 -.0446∗∗ -.0158
(.0658) (.0164) (.0183)
Education .0641∗∗∗ .0230 .0443∗∗∗ .0148 .0066 .0023
(.0131) (.0139) (.0106)
AFQT .0000 .0000 -.0005 -.0002 .0003 .0001
(.0009) (.001) (.0008)
Log Hourly Wage .5229∗∗∗ .1876 .4591∗∗∗ .1529 .449∗∗∗ .1590
(.0497) (.0369) (.0356)
Potential Experience -.0404 .0066 -.0169 .0153 -.0575∗∗∗ -.0044
(.079) (.0647) (.0165)
(Potential Experience)2 .0125 .0018 .0023∗∗∗
(.0095) (.0019) (.0007)
Low Chances of Promotion at Job -.6684∗∗∗ -2.547∗∗∗ -.6184∗∗∗
(.1764) (.857) (.0896)
Moderate Chances of Promotion at Job -.1352 . .
(.1733)
Female -.2184 .1246 .1067
(.1963) (.8411) (.0828)
(Low Chances of Promotion)*Female .1994 3.1252∗∗ .2143
(.2508) (1.2796) (.1317)
(Moderate Chances of Promotion)*Female .2220 . .
(.2579)
(Pot. Experience)*Female .3004∗∗ .0118 .0277
(.1334) (.0981) (.0247)
(Pot. Experience)2*Female -.0402∗∗ -.0005 -.0014
(.0188) (.0028) (.0012)
(Pot. Experience)*Low .0847 .3222∗∗∗ .0912∗∗∗
(.1063) (.0992) (.0239)
(Pot. Experience)2*Low -.0089 -.0098∗∗∗ -.0031∗∗∗
(.0129) (.0028) (.0011)
(Pot. Experience)*Moderate .0011 . .
(.1025)
(Pot. Experience)2*Moderate -.0043 . .
(.0123)
(Pot. Experience)*Low*Female -.1715 -.4153∗∗∗ -.0759∗∗
(.1679) (.1487) (.0374)
(Pot. Experience)2*Low*Female .0322 .013∗∗∗ .0035∗∗
(.0232) (.0043) (.0017)
(Pot. Experience)*Moderate*Female -.2084 . .
(.1745)
(Pot. Experience)2*Moderate*Female .0365 . .
(.0245)
Stayed Married .6652∗∗∗ .2483 .5211∗∗∗ .1811 .4527∗∗∗ .1759
(.0703) (.0456) (.0441)
Single-Married .2826∗∗∗ .1115 .3581∗∗∗ .0703 .2747∗∗∗ .1087
(.0688) (.0868) (.0686)
Married-Single .1183 .0472 .1872∗∗ .1298 .2082∗ .0827
(.2722) (.0946) (.1101)
Non-White .0411 .0164 -.0485 -.0189 .0216 .0086
(.0436) (.0452) (.0384)
Const. -1.4674∗∗∗ -1.6599∗∗∗ -.6445∗∗∗
(.1945) (.6191) (.1149)
Predicted Probability at X .4934 .5983 .4859
Observations 6966 9428 8695
ρ .2187 .4121 .1544
Log-Likelihood -4454.005 -5756.515 -5431.279
χ2 statistic 462.9645 413.2975 832.5092
Groups 4902 5845 2844
Standard errors are in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
For the continuous variables, the marginal effect reported is the mean of the marginal effects in the sample. In the
case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is calculated as Φ(Xd=1 bβ)−Φ(Xd=0 bβ) where d = 1 and d = 0 represent
the dummy variable set to 1 and 0, respectively.aDual Sample refers to individuals that appear in both time periods.
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Table 4.7: Triple Difference Marginal Effects
1979-1982
Base Probabilities
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Men - Low .2674 .2962 .3324
Men - Moderate .4395 .431 .4375
Men - High .494 .4934 .5165
Women - Low .2944 .3836 .4706
Women - Moderate .4694 .51 .5586
Women - High .4935 .5983 .6487
Low vs. High Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.1991 -.2147 -.1781
Men -.2266 -.1972 -.1841
Low vs. Moderate Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.175 -.1264 -.088
Men -.1721 -.1348 -.1051
Moderate vs. High Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.0241 -.0883 -.0901
Men -.0545 -.0624 -.079
Women vs. Men
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Low .027 .0874 .1382
Moderate .0299 .079 .1211
High -.0005 .1049 .1322
The marginal effects are calculated as Φ(Xd=1 bβ)−Φ(Xd=0 bβ) where d = 1
and d = 0 represent the set of dummy variables set to 1 and 0, respec-
tively.
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Table 4.8: Triple Difference Marginal Effects
1996-1998
Base Probabilities
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Men - Low .551 .6193 .6147
Men - High .5452 .5983 .6651
Women - Low .5652 .613 .6948
Women - High .6149 .658 .7092
Low vs. High Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.05 -.045 -.0944
Men .0058 .021 -.0503
Women vs. Men
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Low .0142 -.0062 .0801
High .0696 .0597 .0441
The marginal effects are calculated as Φ(Xd=1 bβ)−Φ(Xd=0 bβ) where d = 1
and d = 0 represent the set of dummy variables set to 1 and 0, respec-
tively.
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Table 4.9: Triple Difference Marginal Effects
Individuals in Both Samples
Base Probabilities
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Men - Low .411 .4783 .4973
Men - High .5772 .4859 .51
Women - Low .4969 .4903 .5344
Women - High .6401 .5766 .5483
Low vs. High Promotion Expectations
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Women -.1432 -.0863 -.0139
Men -.1662 -.0076 -.0127
Women vs. Men
Experience Level -1 Std. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev.
Low .0859 .012 .0371
High .0629 .0907 .0383
The marginal effects are calculated as Φ(Xd=1 bβ)−Φ(Xd=0 bβ) where





In this dissertation, I examined how available information affects both
turnover and promotion. In chapter 2, I found that, in the case of Major
League Baseball managers, firms use multiple measures of performance that
plausibly contain information on manager ability in both termination and re-
hire decisions. I also found that firms use information that is unlikely to
reflect managerial ability in the termination decision. This result raises ques-
tions about whether baseball teams make rational termination decisions. In
chapters 3 and 4, I found that the turnover and promotion decisions differs
considerably by gender. I found that women are less likely to be promoted than
men all else equal yet are more likely to remain on jobs. It is likely that the
difference in the likelihood reflects the fact that firms are unwilling to extend
offers of promotion to women since they perceive them to be more likely than
men to leave the labor force. As a result, women must signal their attachment
to the labor force. The results presented in chapter 3 supports this notion. In
chapter 4, we expanded upon this result by testing the determinants of staying
on a job and how the determinants differ by gender. We found that women
are more likely than men to stay on a jobs with low promotion expectations
and hypothesize that this result reflects the need for women to signal labor
force attachment.
The research presented in chapter 2 is for a specific labor market re-
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lationship. This relationship carries aspects that are unlikely to be found in
other relationships. However, the nature of the job of Major League Baseball
manager shares many things in common with CEOs and other high-level and
high-profile managers. As such, the analysis provides valuable information
regarding the turnover of the same. In each of the jobs the performance of
the manager is difficult to determine since observable output is highly corre-
lated with subordinate performance. Understanding firms actions under this
condition is valuable in the study of the market for high-level managers. The
research also suggests that the contracts for high-level managers are more
complicated than standard contract theory allows for. Future research would
consider the role of ‘public perception’ in firms’ actions. Furthermore, a useful
extension would be to consider whether high-level managers are compensated
for the extra risk they assume by holding ‘high-profile’ jobs.
The research presented in chapters 3 and 4 suggests that there are con-
siderable differences in the market for promotions and in turnover across gen-
der. Chapter 3 suggests that, for women, the unobservables in the promotion
offer equation are uncorrelated with the unobservables in the stay equation
while for men, the unobservables are correlated. The implication is that men
who stay on jobs are more likely to be promoted while for women the decisions
are independent. The results also suggest that men and women may have dif-
ferent career expectations. That is, men may only remain on jobs when they
are likely to receive a promotion while women remain for other reasons. We
explored this explanation in chapter 4 and found evidence that women stay on
jobs in order to signal attachment to the labor force. If this signalling model
is correct, it partly explains any persistent gender wage gap since women need
to remain in low paying jobs in order to signal their attachment to the labor
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force while men can leave these jobs. There are other testable implications of
this model. For example, if the model is correct women should be promoted in
large steps. This promotion pattern would reflect the fact that employers are
unwilling to promote women until they have successfully signalled attachment.
However, once women are promoted they should ‘catch up’ to men. The model
is also consistent with delayed promotions for women. The present research






The standard for hitting performance in baseball has typically been batting
average. This metric is simply the number of hits divided by the number
of at-bats. However, recent developments in sabermetrics have shown that
batting average is a misleading statistic since it does not measure a player’s
effectiveness at acquiring bases, which is the prerequisite for scoring runs.1
Sabermetricians suggest the use of on-base percentage (OBP) plus slugging
percentage (SLG) where
OBP =
H + BB + HBP
AB + BB + HBP + SF
(A.1)
where H is the number of hits, BB is the number of bases-on-balls, HBP is the
number of hit-by-pitch, AB is the number of at-bats, and SF is the number of
sacrifice flies.
SLG =






where 1B is the number of singles, 2B is the number of doubles, 3B is the
number of triples, HR is the number of home runs, and TB is the number of
total bases.
OBP is the likelihood that a player gets on base while SLG is the
number of bases a player acquires per at-bat. The addition of these two metrics
makes a useful measure of player performance but it neglects to account for
stolen bases and arbitrarily assigns equal weight to a point of OBP and a point
1Sabermetrics is the study of baseball using statistics.
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of SLG. Clearly, when a player steals a base, he achieves a base for his team.
A better measure of player performance accounts for these acquired bases.
Furthermore, a better measure does not weight SLG and OBP equally. The
measure I presented in section 2.2.1.2 uses the components of OBP and SLG




The two standard pitching statistics are games won and earned run average





and is simply the number of earned runs allowed (ER) per nine innings pitched
(IP), the typical length of a baseball game.1 The difficulty with these two
metrics is that each is largely dependent upon team performance. The wins
credited to a pitcher depend upon the number of runs his team scores as well
as the number of runs the pitcher allows to the opposition. It is possible that
a pitcher can yield no runs yet if his team scores no runs he will not get credit
for a win. Earned run average is an improvement because it excludes runs
scored by fault of the defense but it is still correlated with team performance
and managerial decisions.2 Pitchers yield bases to hitters who turn the bases
into runs. The metric I presented in section 2.2.1.2 relates the bases a pitcher
allows to the opportunity hitters have to achieve bases at the expense of the
pitcher.
1Another standard that is often used is the ratio of strikeouts to base-on-balls. Prisinzano
(2000) showed that this metric is misleading because this ratio does not necessarily relate
to better outcomes for the team.
2A pitcher is often responsible for runners on base after he has been removed from the
game. If the new pitcher pitches poorly the first pitcher is charged an earned run. In this
situation, the pitcher is subject to both the performance of the new pitcher and managerial
decision to change pitchers.
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